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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
David D. Knoll 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In approaching the intersection of national security and trade 
policies, the underlying issue is the extent to which trading nations 
are prepared to permit the transfer of production functions deemed 
important to national security to more efficient producers in another 
country. Two examples are often raised in order to show how dif-
ficult it is to define "national security." Japan and Switzerland pro-
tect their agriculture.1 Sweden protects its shoe producers. Armies 
need to be both well fed and well soled.2 When the least expensive 
source of food or of shoes lies in another country, even a reliable 
ally, the importing government may nevertheless prefer internal 
sources of supply to be available in a moment of crisis. In 
democracies, public clamour for internal capacity may exist. Indeed, 
the more open the national economy, the greater the need for adap-
tive capabilities in case of disruptions to the international 
marketplace. Reducing vulnerability to such external pressures 
depends upon the adaptability of a nation's economic structure. 
Less adaptable economies utilise protectionism to shield the 
economy from external pressures. If domestic industries are either 
unable or unwilling to adjust, the demand for protection rises.3 It 
is a difficult empirical question to determine how much of the 
domestic demand for protection is a function of defence 
preparedness and how much is a response to local inefficiencies and 
the vagaries of an open, interdependent world economy. 
Countries in the Soviet bloc have largely insulated themselves 
from these fluctuations. Soviet exports decline when business in 
• B.Com., LL.B, University of New South Wales; LL.M, University of Michigan; 
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1. Japan, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 82 (Apr. 20, 1982), 813 (Sept. 7, 1982); Reserva-
tion in the Protocol for the Accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, 14 BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [BISD] 6 (1966). 
2. See, e.g., Santos, The National Security Exception to Free Trade, 30 FED. Bus. NEWS 
& J. 293 (1983). 
3. MALMGREN, Threats to the Multilateral System, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980s 189, 191 
(W. Cline ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as CLINE]. 
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the capitalist world is depressed. Foreign exchange dealings with 
the West and commodity imports therefrom are controlled within 
the scope of the prevailing economic plan. For imports such as grain 
and high technology goods which are used to fill significant gaps 
in domestic supply, however, the Soviet Union is dependent on the 
availability of imports from the West. 
Within the Western World, the United States now shares eco-
nomic preeminence with both the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and Japan. Much consultation occurs. However, while united 
as allies for defence policy purposes, policies with respect to the 
organisation of world markets do not form a cohesive unit. In the 
1980's, no lead for liberalisation of trade policies can be unam-
biguously identified. Economies at different stages of historical 
development, with dissimilar resource endowments and a variety 
of cultures and political systems, can, when left rudderless in the 
wind, develop a sense of vulnerability and defenciveness.4 
Professor Heinz Arndt, writing during the Second World War, 
analysed the pre-War policies of Germany, Japan, and Italy along 
similar lines: 
[S]o long as countries have reason to fear the recurrence of war, 
no emphasis on the economic benefits of international trade will 
induce them to forego such a measure of economic self-sufficiency 
as their governments consider feasible and desirable for their 
military security. 5 
Although the United States, the EEC and Japan conducted 
much of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
without involving middle and lower ranki~ trading nations, the 
dominant three developed neither stellar not, ·confluent policies. The 
"lesser" nations were disappointed at being so excluded. Their con-
fidence in an open world economy was neither restored nor boosted 
after the Tokyo Round.6 A failure to identify and grapple with the 
growing diffusion of economic and political interests has left open 
the possibility of a recurrence of the fear-influenced policies of the 
past. 
4. Cf, Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD 
TRADE L. 93, 95, 96 (1978). 
5. H. ARNDT, THE ECONOMIC LESSONS OF THE NINETEEN-THIRTIES 27 4 (1944). 
6. Jackson, supra note 4, at 95-98. 
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II. ECONOMICS, TRADE AND SECURITY INTERESTS 
A. A COST-BENEFIT MODEL FOR TRADE AND SECURITY 
INTERESTS 
Trade is only entered into when perceived benefits outweigh 
perceived costs. When core values are seen to be at risk, whether 
or not they indeed are, the costs are seen to outweigh the benefits 
of trade. In this balance must lie a recognition that powerful nations 
can induce others to trade with them. Although both gain from the 
exchange they do not gain equally.7 The more efficient economy in-
corporates gains from trade more effectively than its inferior 
trading partner. Realising this, less efficient economies are tempted 
to adopt autarkic policies in the hope of improving their industries, 
and later more profitably, rejoining the currents of world trade. 
It is not surprising that the two great champions of the market 
mechanism in modern times have been Great Britain in the nine-
teenth century and the United States in the twentieth.8 Nation-
State~ with differing economic structures can be expected to in-
ject differing doses of protectionism into their trade policies. 
In analysing international economic history and the 
jurisprudence of international economic law, it is important to keep 
these differences in mind. Whether the differences lead to entropy 
in the society of nations or to convergent goals, lies within and not 
beyond the capacity of our leaders and policy makers. 
B. SUSTAINING A LIBERAL WORLD ECONOMY 
The Ricardian theory of international trade turned upon a static 
approach to comparative advantage. Countries with abundant land 
would export primary produce. Those with abundant labour would 
produce and sell human wares. The relatively more technological-
ly advanced would sell the produce of their know-how. This theory 
was challenged by Alexander Hamilton in his Report on the Subject 
of Manufactures. 9 Hamilton emphasized that relative factor 
7. K. KNORR, BRITISH COLONIAL THEORIES 1570-1870 248 (1944). 
8. With respect to the growing roles of both the EEC and Japan, see BERGSTEN & 
CLINE, Trade Policy in the 1980s: An Overview, in CLINE, supra, note 3, at 59; PATTERSON, The 
European Community as a Threat to the System, in CLINE, supra note 3, at 223; Grey, AN ote 
on U.S. Trade Practices, id. at 243. 
9. The Report was presented to the United States House of Representatives in 1791. 
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endowments10 were fluid and dynamic. For example, the encourage-
ment of immigration causes a shift in relative trading capabilities 
with respect to labour intensive goods. Less efficient nations become 
more efficient not by trading with their superiors but by deliberate-
ly altering their mix of factor endowments and relative efficiency 
levels. 
Hamilton's theory lies behind much of the economic nationalism 
of developing countries in both the past and present. According to 
Professor Richard Gilpin: 
Economic nationalism, both in the nineteenth century and today, 
is a response to the tendency of markets to concentrate wealth 
and power as well as to establish dependency relations between 
strong and weak economies. Although markets over time stimulate 
the diffusion of economic activities and industries, the tendency 
in the short run is for the concentration of wealth in the advanced 
economies to take place faster than the spread of economic activi-
ties in the developing economies. In order to protect its nascent 
industries and safeguard domestic interests against external 
market forces, the government of the developing economy tends 
to pursue protectionist and related nationalistic policies.11 
As the strong gain more from trade than the weak, the gulf 
between them widens. The weak become jealous. The strong become 
anxious. Transposing the argument of Professor John Kenneth 
Galbraith in The Affluent Society12 to the world scene, the more the 
rich have to lose, the more afraid they are of losing their preferred 
position. Nationalistic pressures in the weak and defenciveness of 
the strong, lead to autarkic reorientation by governments.13 Each 
feels a sense of insecurity and takes various protective measures 
which tend toward entropy in international relations. 
The alternative to what shall in this paper be termed "entropic 
autarky" is an open system in which the strong actively assist the 
weak in becoming more efficient at incorporating the gains from 
trade in mutually beneficial ways. The ultimate goal is to maximise 
10. These endowments are Land, Labour, Capital/Technology and Enterprise (Manage-
ment Skills). 
11. GILPIN, Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective, 
in ECONOMIC ISSUES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 404-41 (K. Knorr & F.N. Trager eds. 1977). See 
generally H. JOHNSON, ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN OLD AND NEW STATES (1967). 
12. J.K. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (3d ed. 1976). 
13. See generally MALMGREN, supra note 3, at 191; Jackson, supra note 4, at 93. 
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the gains from trade while catering to the development needs of 
weaker economies. The empirical questions of identifying, evaluating 
and utilising the fluid components of comparative advantage are 
beyond the scope of this paper. It is the thesis of this paper that 
the process of entropic autarky brings into full view the interface 
between trade policy and national security .14 The system of inter-
national economic law cannot profitably ignore the problem and in-
deed its progressive development can only benefit from a reasoned 
approach to both the national security issue and the process of en-
tropic autarky to which it is related. 
III. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN 
NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 
A. LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
International law survives by consensus. The Nation-States 
which form the constituency of international law do not legislate 
through a parliament or congress, seldom litigate their differences 
before a court or tribunal, and are not the subjects of a suprana-
tional executive or sovereign. Professor Louis Henkin has concluded: 
Nations sometimes have to determine law for themselves from am-
biguous precedents, in circumstances rendering objectivity difficult 
and where the area of permissible conduct is not obviously defined . 
. . . That the action will never in fact be passed upon by such [an 
international] tribunal, that some may question the very concept 
of impartiality of an international tribunal, that lawfulness is in 
fact determined for their own purposes by governments inevitably 
more-or-less partial, may modify but does not vitiate the basic con-
ception of lawfulness or unlawfulness in the behaviour of nations.15 
Professor Roger Fisher has argued that compliance with law 
by governments (and persons) does not depend on the availability 
of organised force to coerce compliance. Rather, the subjects of law 
assess for themselves their long-term interests and find that com-
pliance and orderly conduct are beneficial thereto.16 An order which 
serves the perceived interests of a majority or dominant section 
of its constituency is enduring. So long as disobedience is the ex-
14. MALMGREN, supra note 3, at 199·200. 
15. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 41·42 (2d ed. 1979). 
16. Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1961). 
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ception rather than the rule, the system functions smoothly. Pro-
fessor Fisher of Harvard Law School considers that coerced com-
pliance lubricates but does not fuel the wheels of a legal system. 
The international system, however, lacks this lubricant. Interna-
tional law does lack that element of precision which might assist 
its usefulness in preventing as well as tempering the breach of or 
interference with trading obligations on national security grounds. 
As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has observed: 
[O]nce we approach at close quarters practically any branch of in-
ternational law, we are driven, amidst some feeling of incredulity, 
to the conclusion that although there is as a rule a consensus of 
opinion on broad principle - even this may be an overestimate in 
some cases - there is no semblance of agreement in relation to 
specific rules and problems.17 
In the international arena, it is states practice, more often than 
judicial decisions, which serves to concretise the principles. 
Resistance to legal restraints based upon an insistence that lacunae 
or gaps in the law exist and so, a matter is purely political, has 
been short-lived even at the instance of great powers. The Soviet 
Union could not survive without trade and diplomacy. She has 
asserted customary principles such as territorial integrity, sovereign 
and diplomatic immunities, and the binding effect of treaties often 
under the rubric of "peaceful coexistence."18 Similarly, as China con-
tinues to incorporate herself into the society of nations, she has 
invoked and applied international law, even with respect to security 
concerns.19 
This reference to law gives a framework in which states may 
further their interests, even their vital interests. Law can also 
engender order and peaceful processes for the resolution of disputes. 
Entropic autarky is more likely to proceed when nations' senses 
of insecurity lead to not only distrust of other nations, but of the 
legal framework in which international relations are conducted. In 
urging, as Professor John Jackson has, a revival of "rule diplomacy" 
rather than "power diplomacy," it is the reversal of the process 
17. Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 16, 17 (1955); see J. STONE OF LAW AND NATIONS 211-12 (1974). 
18. L. HENKIN, supra note 15, at 108-09. 
19. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1962, at l, col. 6. China challenged her border with 
India charging that the so-called McMahon line wa an illegally drawn border. 
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of entropic autarky which is sought.20 Because it is states' vital in-
terests which are at stake, the international lawyer needs to pro-
ceed delicately. This, however, is not to say that these fundamental 
issues should be sidestepped or ignored.21 
It has often been stated that international law, including in-
ternational economic law, does not operate in times of war or of 
serious crisis.22 Yet this margin beyond which the rule of law may 
not venture forth is seldom defined. Though many have called for 
an expanded use of international arbitration as a means of settling 
international disputes, the call has "rather symbolised the messianic 
hope of subjecting the sovereign State, with its claim to be its own 
sole judge, to the olympian impartiality of third party judgement 
as a means of abolishing war."23 While hopes for third party preven-
tion of war may be forlorn, the removal of security issues from in-
ternational forums by the unilateral decisions of states can only im-
pair the dispute resolution process. 
International law is enforced by the subtle means of peer 
pressure. Once the problem receives an airing in an international 
forum, resolution without formal adjudication may occur as the 
states involved listen to and perhaps better understand their 
neighbour's interests. Indeed, states may be more willing to place 
security concerns on the table for discussion if they have no need 
to fear a formal adjudication against their interests. Without arising 
grievances, resolution by less than peaceful means is more inviting 
an option if only because mutual understanding has not been given 
a chance to develop. 
So it is in international economic law. By providing a framework 
for economic activity undertaken to protect national security to be 
discussed, international as well as national objectives can be pur-
sued. An act of protectionism or a currency restriction does not 
lose its economic character because it also has a security flavour. 
20. JACKSON, GATT Machinery and the Tokyo Round Agreements, in CLINE supra note 
3 at 159-87; see also Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 
12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21 (1980); Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade 
System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93 (1978). 
21. J. STONE, Law and Force: Some Tasks for Survival, in OF LA w AND NATIONS 443, 446 
(1974). 
22. See, e.g., H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 282-83 (4th ed. 1967). 
23. J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 98 (1959). 
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B. WAR, COLD WAR AND THE LAW OF PEACE 
International relations are replete with examples of unfriendly 
relations not accompanied by similar hostilities. Jessup suggested 
three characteristics of such "cold war."24 First, a hostility and strain 
between opposing parties would be identified.25 Second, no solution 
of a focal issue would restore friendly relations.26 Finally, the op-
posing parties would exhibit a reluctance to resort to armed force 
at least for extended periods of time.27 According to Jessup, the 
replacement of an illusion of peace with a legal declaration of the 
"state of intermediacy" would clarify international legal relations.28 
Negotiations for limited objects would not be accompanied by disap-
pointment at incomplete resolution since the state of intermediacy 
would be a "normal" condition.29 Professor McDougal has rejected 
even this trichotomy arguing for a recognition by international deci-
sionmakers that "peace" and "war" are but polar extremes of a con-
tinuum of degrees of coercion.30 
The identification of the degree of coercion is a prerequisite 
to, but not the same task as, evaluating a conflict from the decision-
maker's perspective and then developing a policy response. Inter-
national law can come into play at the evaluation stage. By categoriz-
ing the permissibility of the initial conduct, the law may prohibit, 
permit or mandate a response. It is this functional deficiency which 
caused Professor Julius Stone to remark: 
Besides its lamentable effects in discouraging efforts to mitigate 
human sufferings, the well-intentioned refusal to recognise the 
obstinate complexity of the role of war also prevents recognition 
of the extent to which this role projects itself into times of peace.31 
The Soviet response to the suggestions of Professors Jessup 
and McDougal has been given by Professor Tunkin in his Hague 
24. Jessup, Should International L aw Recognize an Intermediate S tatus Between Peace 
and War, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 98 (1954). 
25. Id. at 100-01. 
26. Id. at 101. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 102. Normalcy, in fact , is not desirable as a value. 
30. McDougal, Peace and War: Factual Continuum with Multiple Legal Consequences, 
49 AM. J. lNT'L L. 63 (1955). 
31. J. STONE, supra note 23, at xxxvi. 
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lectures.32 The recognition of an underlying condition of hostility 
was anathema to the stated Soviet preference for "peaceful coex-
istence." The difference between East and West on ideological issues 
is not, according to Professor Tunkin, "an insurmountable obstacle 
to reaching an agreement relating to accepting specific rules as 
norms of international law."33 Perhaps the most famous test of the 
relevance of law in time of crisis is the case of the Cuban quaran-
tine in October 1962. The facts need not be recounted here; suffice 
to say that war did not break out.34 Nevertheless, former U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson reported to the American Socie-
ty of International Law: "I cannot believe that there are principles 
of law that say we must accept destruction of our way of life. No 
law can destroy the state creating the law. The survivial of states 
is not a matter of Law."35 
Yet it appears that international law was referred to exten-
sively in conditioning the means whereby survival interests were 
to be upheld by the Kennedy administration.36 The effects on trade 
relations of a cold war (or state of intermediacy to use Professor 
J essup's term) may validly be compared to the effects of war upon 
economic obligations. The legal outbreak of war creates changes 
in the legal force of international transactions regardless of the state 
of hostilities. 
As to treaties such as defence accords, it may be safely sug-
gested that the threat or existence of hostilities will activate rather 
than diminish their applicability. Treaties dealing with matters such 
as neutrality and economic cooperation, including friendship, com-
merce and navigation treaties, will almost certainly be abrogated 
in a state of belligerency.37 Between these two classes, international 
law has little clarified the grey areas of the spectrum. In particular, 
modern trade and economic cooperation agreements,38 including the 
32. Tunkin, Co-E xistence and General International Law, 95 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL RECUEIL DES COURS [A.D.l.R.C.) l, 72-74 (1958). 
33. Id. at 59. 
34. See E. MCWHINNEY: "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" AND SOVIET-WESTERN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 72-85 (1964). See generally id. at 73-74, nn.2, 5 & 6 (sources cited in footnotes). 
35. Acheson, Law and Conflict: Changing Patterns and Contemporary Challenges, [1963] 
PRoc. AM. Soc·y INT'L L. 13, 14. 
36. See E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 34, at 78-79, nn. 21-26. 
37. J. STONE. supra note 23, at 448. 
38. See infra note 127. 
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), make allowance 
for breakdown of peaceful relations presumably in order to ensure 
survival of the agreement up to restoration of peaceful relations.39 
The comparative effects of war and cold war upon economic rela-
tions can be seen by reviewing the cold war of the 1950's and 1960's. 
In the immediate post-World War II period, Denmark agreed 
to supply the Soviet Union with a tanker. The United States pressed 
Denmark to break its agreement. Delivery could lead to termination 
of aid to Denmark under the so-called "Battle Act." Denmark re-
mained unwilling to terminate its agreement, and the United States 
did not terminate aid because to do so would have been "detrimental 
to the security of the United States." There was an acknowledge-
ment that U.S. security interests were better served by maintain-
ing East-West trade links and upholding treaty obligations than by 
utilising coercion, albeit in support of American defence policy but 
in violation of international law. This is not to say that defence policy 
is always subordinated to legal restr.-a'.ints, but rather, that it is 
tempered by them. George Keenan, a distinguished American diplo-
mat, stressed that the role of law in ensuring the smooth function-
ing of international life was minimal at best where states' vital in-
terests or military security were concerned, but limited these excep-
tional circumstances to "those elementary upheavals that involve 
the security of great political systems or reflect the emotional 
aspirations and fears of entire nations."'0 
This extreme condition did not surround that recent attempt 
by President Reagan to block the flow of goods and technology to 
the Soviet Gas Pipeline being built to link the Soviet Union and 
Western Europe. In this example, too, U.S. measures were unsuc-
cessful. The legal arguments of Western Europeans,41 adequately 
canvassed elsewhere, were persuasive.42 
39. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXI, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-1, T.l.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (effective Jan. 1, 1948). Summary Record of the Eigh-
teenth Meeting, Sixth Committee: Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 2/CONF. 2/C.6/SR. 18. 
40. G. KEENAN, REALITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 38-39 (2d ed. 1966). 
41. Commission of the European Communities, Legal Service, European Communities: 
Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with the U.S.S.R. , reprinted in 211.L.M. 
891 (1982). 
42. Aide-Memoire of the Commission of the European Communities and the Embassy 
of France presented to the U.S. Department of State, Mar. 20, 1984, at 3. 
10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1984], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss3/5
1984] International Economic Law 577 
C. NATIONAL SECURITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In accepting national security as a valid objective of states and 
as a jurisprudential concern, it is postulated that international 
economic law may look to the more general public international law 
as a model for developing its rules. 
Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations sought 
to deem war against one League member to be a war against all 
League members automatically requiring a complete economic em-
bargo against the state breaching the Covenant by a declaration 
of war. Of course consensus was most elusive on the initial ques-
tion of whether a breach of the Covenant had actually occurred. 
This question was left for each state's subjective determination.43 
This subjective element effectively defeased the collective nature 
of the international security arrangement. So long as one state of 
some influence opposed sanctions, collective control could not work. 
Self-protection, though formally a residual remedy was, in fact, a 
more futile response than awaiting the unravelling of collective pro-
cess. In recognition of this, the United Nations (UN) order embodies 
both individual and collective defence mandates. The collective man-
date can only be effected by the Security Council and is subject 
to veto, an approach more realistic than that of the League 
Convenant.44 
In particular, the doctrine of self-preservation appears to be 
readily adaptable to the economic scene. This doctrine stems from 
the negotiations relating to the Destruction of the Caroline between 
the then British rulers of Canada and the United States, The facts 
of the Caroline case are as follows: 
The case rose out of the Canadian Rebellion of 1837. The rebel 
leaders, despite steps taken by U.S. authorities to prevent 
assistance being given to them, managed on December 13, 1837, 
to enlist at Buffalo, in the U.S., the support of a large number of 
American nationals. The resulting force established itself on Navy 
Island in Canadian waters from which it raided the Canadian shore 
and attacked passing British ships. The force was supplied from 
the U.S. shore by an American ship, the Caroline. On the night 
43. Assembly Res. Vl.2, The Economic Weapon, LEAGUE OF NATIONS 0.J. Spec. Supp. 
No. 6, at 24 (1920-21). 
44. Neff, The Law of Economic Coercion: Lessons from the Past and Indications of the 
Future, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 411, 428-31 (1981). 
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of December 29-30, the British sefaed the Caroline which was then 
in the American port of Schlosser, fired her, and sent her over 
Niagara Falls. Two U.S. nationals were killed. The legality of the 
British acts was discussed in detail in correspondence in 1841-42 
when the U.K. sought the release of a British subject, McLeod, 
who had been arrested in the U.S. on charges of murder and arson 
arising out of the incident.45 
In defence of the British action, Lord Ashburton pleaded necessity 
but cautioned "[t]his must always be a subject of much delicacy, 
and should be considered by friendly nations with great candor and 
forbearance." 46 
For the United States, Secretary of State Webster stated the 
conditions for a legitimate act of self-preservation which have now 
become an axiom of international law: 
Undoubtedly it is just, that, while it is admitted that exceptions 
growing out of the great law of self-defence do exist, those excep-
tions should be confined to cases in which the 'necessity of that 
self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation'.47 
Curiously, Mr Webster hinted that the rule was not limited to 
military situations and self-defence in that sense. This hint has been 
taken up most recently in the case concerning the Air Services 
Agreement of March 27, 1946, between the United States and 
France.48 Arbitrators Riphagen, Ehrlich and Reuter applied the rule 
to a case of reprisal for alleged breach of a commercial treaty. 
In considering the question of proportionality, the Tribunal took 
into account the relative injuries suffered and the importance of 
the questions of principle arising from the alleged breach.49 The 
Tribunal rejected the plea that a duty to negotiate first, in order 
not to aggravate the dispute, had to be satisfied to legitimate the 
45. 2 J. MOORE. A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LA w 409, 412 (1842); c.f. N aulilaa Case (Port. 
v. Ger.) 2 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1012, 1016 (1928). 
46. Letter from Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary to Mr. Webster, Secretary 
of State for the United States (July, 28, 1842), reprinted in J. MOORE, supra note 45, at 411-12. 
47. Letter from Mr. Webster, Secretary of State for the United States, to Lord Ash-
burton, British Plenipotentiary (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in J. MOORE, supra note 45, at 412 
(emphasis added). 
48. Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March (U.S. v. Fr.) 54 l.L.R. 
303 (Arbitral Tribunal established by a Compromis of Arbitration 1979). 
49. Id. at 338, para. 83. 
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reprisal. 50 However, the reprisals had to be withdrawn as a sign 
of good faith when the dispute was set down for arbitration or 
judicial settlement.51 Legitimacy did not depend upon necessity of 
response. It seems that economic reprisal may be distinguished from 
its military equivalent in that the only condition for legitimacy 
where armed force is not involved is that of proportionality. 
Whether this rule can be transposed to the frameworks of the 
GA TT and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) remains a topic 
for exploration in succeeding sections of this paper. 
Even in the general context, it is surprising that the Tribunal 
found no duty to postpone retaliatory action until less inflammatory 
yet practicable pressures had been exhausted. Articles 2(3) and 33 
of the United Nations Charter impose a duty of pacific settlement 
in cases where international peace and security are endangered.52 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 being a "Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the 
Charter"53 has added body to the principle and extended it, de lege 
ferenda, to less serious disputes. The principles have been reaffirmed 
in the Manila Declaration on Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes.54 The norm derives from Security Council Resolution 188 
condemning reprisals "as incompatible with the purposes and prin-
ciples of the United Nations."55 
Differences of opinion exist between eminent jurists as to 
whether there is a norm of obligation expressing a condition of 
necessity for legitimacy of retaliatory action56 or a norm of aspira-
tion with whose compliance legitimacy is better grounded but 
50. Id. at 338-39, paras. 84-89. 
51. Id. at 340-41, para. 96. 
52. See generally Blum, Economic Boycotts in International Law, 12 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 
5, 13-15 (1977); Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo and U.S. Pressure Against Chile: Economic 
and Political Concern and the Charter of the United Nations, 7 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3, 
31-32 (1974). 
53. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR (1833d plen. mtg), U.N. Doc A/4355, Pt. VIII, at 1, reprinted in 65 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 243 (1971). 
54. Draft, Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 
U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.32/Add.1 (March 18, 1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M.449 (1982). 
55. Resolution adopted by the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/5650 (1964). 
56. See generally P. JESSUP. A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1948); SKUBISZEWSKI. Use 
of Force by States. Collective Security. The Law of War and Neutrality, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC 
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neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of legality. 57 Professor 
Riphagen appears to have considered the doctrines of necessity and 
exhaustion of more pacific means of redress to be no more than 
norms of aspiration from which states were entitled to deviate. 
During the preparation of Resolution 2625, "the complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations" was argued to be at least 
as much in need of regulation as military action.58 This argument 
was resisted by Western delegates for whom economic measures 
were to be considered valid means of influencing other states' 
policies.59 To the former group of states, insisting upon prior ex-
haustion of direct negotiations promoted compromise of competing 
interests; whilst to the latter, freedom to experiment with means 
of settlement was of higher priority.60 For the law to channel states' 
actions taken for self-preservation, a consensus was needed as to 
when the threshold threat to national security would be sufficient-
ly evident to be effectively controlled. This consensus remained ab-
sent. Proscription of such defencive action can only be chimerical.61 
Short of proscription, the legal channelling of self-help into less 
disruptive yet effective behaviours remains a desirable if challeng-
ing goal. Doctrines of peaceful settlement stemming from Article 
INTERNATIONAL LA w 7 45-46 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968); Henkin, Force, Intervention and Neutrali-
ty in Contemporary International Law, [1963] PROC. AM. Soc·v. INT'L. L. 147. 
57. See Case Concerning Air Services Agreement, supra note 48 and accompanying 
text; Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 
81 A.D.l.R.C. 500 (1952); D. BOWETT. SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (1958); J. STONE, 
supra note 17, at 1-38. 
58. See, e.g., Speach of Mr. Dadzie (Ghana), U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.5 at 17 (Oct. 16, 
1964); Speech of Dr. Khalil (Egypt), U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.8 (Oct. 16, 1964); Speech of Dr. 
Pechoto (Czech.), U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.8 at 4-6 (Oct. 16, 1964); and Speeches of Dr. Krishna 
Rao (India), U.N. Docs. A/AC.119/SR.3 at 7-8, (Oct. 16, 1964), A/AC.119/SR.23 at 6 (Oct. 22, 
1964). These speeches were made to the Special Committee on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States. 
59. See, e.g., Speeches of Sir Kenneth Bailey (Aust.), U.N. Docs. A/AC.119/SR.10 at 
7 (Oct. 16, 1964), A/AC.119/SR at 14-15 (Oct. 22, 1964); Speech of Mr. Colombo (Arg.), U.N. 
Doc. A/AC.119/SR.19 at 18 (Oct. 19, 1964); Speeches of Mr. Schwebel (U.S.), U.N. Docs. 
A/AC.119/SR.3 at 12 (Oct.16, 1964), A/AC.119/SR.15 at 17-18 (Oct. 19, 1964), A/AC.119/SR.22 
at 19 (Oct. 22, 1964); Speeches of Mr. Sinclair (U.K.), U.N. Docs. A/AC.199/SR.5 at 12-13 (Oct. 
16, 1964), A/AC.119/SR.16 at 13 (Oct. 19, 1964), A/AC.119/SR.19 at 5-8 (Oct. 21, 1964). These 
speeches were made to the Special Committee of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States. 
60. McWhinney, The "New" Countries and the "New" International Law: The Union 
Nations' Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, 60 AM. J. 
INT'L L. l, 17-18 (1966). 
61. J. STONE. supra note 17, at 2-3; J. STONE, supra note 23, at 243-46. 
14
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1984], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss3/5
1984] International Economic Law 581 
2(3) of the UN Charter can provide a springboard for further 
developments. 
Resolution 2625 is ambivalent between its dual roles of codify-
ing classical legal principles and developing a peaceful world order. 
It speaks to independent rather than interdependent states.62 In-
ternational economic law, as developed through the jurisprudence 
of the GATT, is arguable more consonant with international inter-
dependence. The difference shows up in GATT practice a that prac-
tice deviates from the aforementioned practice under the doctrine 
of self-preservation. 
IV. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARRIFFS AND 
TRADE (GATT) 
A. THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION 
Originally drafted contemporaneously with the Charter of the 
proposed International Trade Organization (ITO), the GATT was 
fashioned to be the embodiment of the results of tariff negotiations 
held in Geneva from April to October, 1947.63 It contained clauses 
to protect against the harms of evasions of tariff commitments. The 
general GATT clauses were comparable with, yet subsidiary to, the 
ITO Charter. Following upon delays and difficulties in obtaining 
American Congressional approval of the ITO Chapter, the ITO was 
stillborn, and in order to accommodate lengthy parliamentary ap-
proval procedures in other countries, the GATT itself was not 
brought into force. 
Instead, the GATT was brought to life through a "Protocol of 
Provisional Application" signed i.n 1947 and effective on January 
l, 1948.64 So, by this circuitous route the focal body of international 
trade law was born.65 The Protocol activates the GATT with two 
main differences from the text of the treaty. These are first, a grand-
62. Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L. L. 713, 735 (1971). 
63. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 39. 
64. Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (effective Jan. 1, 1948). 
65. See generally E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 3-4 (1982); J. 
JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 369-89 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as JACKSON 1977); J. JACKSON. WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT § 3.2 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as JACKSON 1969). 
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father clause66 immunising inconsistent legislation existing on Oc-
tober 30, 1947, and second, a shorter notice requirement for 
withdrawal from the GATT, namely sixty days rather than six 
months as in the GATT proper.67 Neither of these differences af-
fect the following discourse. In effect, the states' party to the Pro-
tocol apply the GATT treaty itself. 
The object and purpose of the GATT are primarily to be 
garnered from the text of the treaty and particularly the preamble.68 
The GATT has a concise preamble. It expresses the purpose, scope 
and genus of tools embodied in the agreement. Economic wealth 
maximisation is to be achieved by a liberalisation of international 
trade barriers including tariffs, quantitative restrictions and 
discriminatory treatment. Article XXI reads as follows: 
Security Exceptions 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any informa-
tion the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential 
security interests; or 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action 
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from 
which they are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and im-
plements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials 
as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying 
a military establishment; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in inter-
national relations; or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action 
in pursuance of its obligations under the UN Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.69 
66. Protocol of Provisional Application, supra note 64, art. l(a). 
67. See, Protocol of Provisional Application, id. art. 5; c.f General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, supra note 39, art. XXXI. 
68. I. SINCLAIR. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 75 (1973) (citing 
Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation with Special Reference to the Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT'L & COMP. 
L.Q. 318 (1969); c.f, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17(2) of the Charter), 
1962 I.C.J. 150, 186 (Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962) (J. Spender, separate opinion). 
69. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 39, art. XXL 
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Ninety nations are party to the GATT.70 One, Tunisia, has 
acceded provisionally, and twenty-eight maintain de facto applica-
tion of the GATT.71 This is arguably equivalent to one hundred and 
nineteen contemporary, identical declarations by those states of 
their understanding of the state of law, at least de legeferenda. This 
understanding cements into lex lata as their subsequent behaviours 
converge in compliance with the Treaty.72 It is not clear whether 
this cementation has occurred for part of all of the GATT. An "ex-
tensive and virtually uniform" states practice is required.73 A sense 
of legal obligation or opinio juris sive necessitas need accompany 
the behaviour.74 However, as Professor Baxter has observed: 
The hard fact is that States more often than not do not refer to 
or exhibit any sense of legal obligation in their own conduct. Men-
tion of 'obligation' and 'duty' is more often to be found in 
statements about what other States should do than in a State's 
assertions about what it itself is doing.75 
Difficulty in identifying a real sense of obligation has plagued the 
legal interpretation of General Assembly resolutions such as Resolu-
tion 2625 on Friendly Relations averted to above. 
In the economic sphere, the problem is an acute one. Having 
different economic structures and in particular, different exchange 
mechanisms, the rules of and exceptions in the GA TT system may 
be interpreted according to competing legal principles whose ap-
plications reflect a variety of value laden choices. A formal absence 
of restriction on certain conduct renders the conduct legally neutral 
but also has the effect of permitting it.76 An aura of normalcy may 
develop so long as the neutrality of the law continues. This aura 
hides the structural differences between economies and the variety 
of values embedded in a pluralistic international constituency. 
Because much secrecy surrounds the national security policies of 
states, the problems of identifying, analysing and consensually 
reconciling these policies is compounded. 
70. E. McGOVERN supra note 65, at 45-46. 
71. Id. at 46. 
72. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 A.D.l.R.C. 25, 55 (1970). 
73. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 
3, 43 (Judgment of Feb. 20, 1969). 
74. Id. at 44. 
75. Baxter, supra note 72, at 68. 
76. See J. STONE, supra note 17, at 83-86; Goldie, Legal Pluralism and "No Law" Sec-
tors, 32 AUST'L. L.J. 220 (1958). 
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B. APPROACHING THE INTERPRETATION OF GATT ARTICLE XX! 
Whether or not Article XXI and other provisions of the GA TT 
have evolved into customary international law is a matter of in-
terest because over one-third of the family of nations are neither 
party to nor apply the GATT, yet have significant economic and 
security interests. Before ascribing to the norm a customary 
character, identification of its content needs to be undertaken. 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties77 prescribe an order for assessing the relative value of the 
materials available for treaty interpretation.78 Much doctrinal 
dispute surrounds the issue of treaty interpretation.79 The very ex-
istence of relevant guiding principles has been challenged.80 In any 
text one can find ambiguities and imprecisions.81 The GATT is no 
exception. What follows will be an attempt to apply the inter-
pretative process of the Vienna Convention without submerging 
the value laden choices which arise. 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires an examination 
of text, context, and relations between the parties following treaty 
formation. This article has arguably achieved the status of 
customary international law.82 
Seven key issues will be investigated in an effort to interpret 
the GATT in relation to the Vienna Convention: 
(1) The role of "good faith" in interpreting the national 
security exception to GATT obligations, including the use of Arti-
cle XXI to excuse the impeding of the attainment of GATT 
objectives. 
(2) The scope of Article XXI and the subject-matter to which 
it applies. 
77. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted 
in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 885 (1969). 
78. I. SINCLAIR. supra note 68, at 73. 
79. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 68. 
80. Stone, Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation, 1 SYDNEY L. REV. 344 (1955). 
81. See D. O'CONNELL. INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR STUDENTS 108 (1971); Address by w. w. 
Bishop Jr., Seminar on the Law of Treaties, University of Michigan (Mar. 19, 1984); c.f Report 
of the International Law Commission, 21 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 9) at 50 U.N. Doc. 
A/6309/Rev.1 (1966). 
82. See, e.g., Opinion of Her Majesty's Law Officers, Cmnd. 4589 at 15; I. SINCLAIR, 
supra note 68, at 14-23; Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 
at 94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/186 (1966). 
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(3) The interrelationship between the most favoured nation 
rule (MFN) and security concerns. 
(4) The use and abuse of security concerns in excusing a 
"nullification or impairment" of a contracting party's benefits under 
the GATT. 
(5) Differentiation between restrictions on imports and restric-
tions on exports pursuant to Article XXL 
(6) The interpretation of Article XXI as a "waiver" clause ad-
ditional to Article XXV. 
(7) The issue of reference of political issues to the UN and 
of the Contracting Parties declining to pass upon politically sen-
sitive issues. 
C. Two GATT DISPUTES RAISING ARTICLE XXI ISSUES 
The national security exception is of special relevance to U.S. 
defence policies. This is because U.S. policies are directed at both 
the interests of the United States and its allies. The United States 
remains the fulcrum of Western defence policies.83 It is not surpris-
ing then to find the United States as the respondent in the two 
major GA TT disputes involving Article XXL The search is for cases, 
subsequent interpretative or applicative agreements, and states 
practice evidencing what states party to the GATT understand to 
be the meaning of Article XXL 
In the first case, very early in GATT history, Czechoslovakia 
complained to the GATT Council that the United States was in viola-
tion of its GATT obligations because American export licences were 
preventing certain exports to Czechoslovakia on a discriminatory 
basis. The United States relied upon Article XXI to excuse the effec-
tive removal of MFN to Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the U.S. action was 
a political statement aimed at the whole Soviet bloc. The Czechoslo-
vakian government expressed concern at the tendency towards 
autarky which a broad reading of Article XXI would involve. The 
83. S ee, e.g., Report on the Effects of Oil Imports on National Security, Department 
of Treasury, 44 Fed. Reg. 18,818 (1979). Within the report, see a letter from Robert B. Pirie, 
Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRAEL), to the Honorable Robert 
H. Mundheim, General Counsel, Department of Treasury (Feb. 26, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 18,828 
(1979), that discusses an investigation of oil imports conducted under section 232(b) of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Within the report, see also a letter from Richard N. Cooper, 
Acting Secretary of State, to the Honorable Robert H. Mundheim, General Counsel, Depart-
ment of Treasury (Apr. 3, 1978), 44 Fed. Reg. 18,841 (1979). 
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U.S. action was to be seen as an undue control based upon a pretext 
of national security.84 
In the second case, by Presidential Proclamation No. 4941 of 
May 5, 1982, the President of the United States imposed an import 
quota on sugar.85 Nicaragua was allocated a share of 2.1 percent 
of the total imports by volume. This share was in line with 
Nicaragua's market share for the period 1975-81. The quota took 
effect on May 11, 1982. A year later on May 10, 1983, the Nicaraguan 
quota was reduced from 58,000 short tons to 6,000 short tons. The 
U.S. action was part of a policy of supporting the government of 
El Salvador in a border dispute with Nicaragua. The economic sanc-
tion of cutting sugar imports from Nicaragua was designed to 
weaken the regional influence of the leftist Nicaraguan government. 
The difference was allotted to El Salvador, Honduras and Costa 
Rica, nations which are not party to the GATT. Nicaragua unsuc-
cessfully sought consultations with the United States and then com-
plained under GATT Article XXIII that the United States had, by 
its action, discriminated against Nicaragua and "nullified or im-
paired" Nicaragua's GATT benefits. The United States declined to 
accept GATT jurisdiction over the matter. It saw the dispute as 
politically sensitive and beyond the expertise of a technical economic 
organisation. 
By Presidential Proclamation No. 5104 of September 23, 1983, 
a decision was implemented to further reduce the quota. Paragraph 
four included the following statement: "I find [that] the additional 
modifications of the quantitative limitations ... give due considera-
tion to the interests in the United States' sugar market of domestic 
producers and materially affected contracting parties to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."86 Whether this opinion is well 
grounded in the jurisprudence of the GA TT is examined in the 
following discussion. 
D. THE DOCTRINE OF "GOOD FAITH" IN GATT JURISPRUDENCE 
The important condition of "good faith" is too often glossed 
over by commentators and becomes particularly relevant at the 
84. GATT Doc. CP.3/SR.22 at 4 (June 8, 1949); cf, GATT Docs. CP.3/SR.20, CP.3/23, 
CP.3/38, CP.3/39. 
85. Proclamation No. 4941, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,661 (1982), reprinted in 96 Stat. 2740 (1982). 
86. Proclamation No. 5104, 48 Fed. Reg. 44057 (1983), reprinted in 97 Stat._ (1983). 
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margin of the law of peace. The interpreter should be wary of the 
exercise of a legal right bestowed upon one constituent to the detri-
ment of the communal whole.87 Similarly, improper motive vitiates 
the legitimacy of permitted conduct.88 An interpretation which con-
dones acts which endanger international peace and security or con-
stitutes illegal force is not in good faith. Even though the defini-
tions of these two limitations upon state sovereignty have proven 
particularly elusive89 a "good faith" interpretation of provisions such 
as GA TT Article XXI require a limiting role to be recognised for 
the "good faith" principle.90 This is so that the exception should not 
be validly invoked in support of action which makes a negative con-
tribution to world peace. 
International or national peace and security are not the primary 
objects and purposes of a treaty concerned with the liberalisation 
of trade. Recognising that the two concerns intersect, the treaty 
provides for its own continuity in crisis circumstances. The simple 
opening words of Article XXI can only be given a wide literal mean-
ing at the expense of the object and purpose of the GATT. Article 
XXI is an exception to and not a rule of GATT law. Permitting 
unilateral interpretation without recourse to multilateral overview 
may appear to be value-neutral. It would allow the exception to 
emasculate the rules of a liberal trade order. 
The International Court of Justice has been presented with 
an opportunity to pass upon the good faith limitation to unilateral 
interpretation of international law. In the Case of Certain Norwegian 
Loans,91 Norway objected to the jurisdiction of the Court. She relied, 
in part, upon the French declaration accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court which reserved from the Court's purview 
matters "which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as 
understood by the French government."92 The Norwegian accep-
tance of compulsory jurisdiction was limited by a, condition of 
87. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 286-88 
(2d ed. 1966). 
88. Fur Seal Arbitration, 1 Moore's A r bitrations 875, 890 (1893); Iluyomade, The Scope 
and Content of a Complaint of Abuse of R ight in International L aw, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 
74 (1975). 
89. S ee generally J . STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS (1977). 
90. A ccord J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 295-97 (4th ed. 1949). 
91. Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9 (Judgment of July 
6, 1957). 
92. Id. at 21 (quoting the French Declaration). 
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reciprocity.93 Norway was therefore entitled to withdraw from the 
Court's jurisdiction matters validly reserved therefrom by the 
French. Pursuant to Article 36(6) of its statute, the Court was faced 
with an enquiry into its own jurisdiction. By twelve votes to three, 
the Court held for Norway. Nine of the majority judges delivered 
a joint opinion which uncritically upheld the Norwegian objection. 
However, Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht held the French accep-
tance to be illusory and of no legal effect because a state could not 
validly accede to compulsory jurisdiction whilst withholding from 
the Court the judicial power to delimit that jurisdiction.94 A similar 
analysis pertained to other instruments of acceptance of jurisdic-
tion, notably those of the United States, Mexico, Pakistan, India, 
South Africa, Liberia and possibly the United Kingdom.95 The 
United Kingdom limited the subject matter of its reservation to 
"national security." Nevertheless, if Judge Lauterpacht's analysis 
is to be accepted, the U .K. reservation is also invalid because the 
state rather than the Court is formally accorded the power to 
delimit the scope of its own reservation.96 
The dissentients did not accept as legally valid such a 
withholding, but preferred to uphold the validity of the French ac-
ceptance by construing it as subject to an ultimate judicial power 
to delimit jurisdiction.97 Norway could not be understood to have 
interpreted a legal document so as to give unreasonable or absurd 
consequences to that document.98 
Judges Basdevant and Read (dissenting) applied the legal 
presumption of good faith by inserting a sense of objectivity into 
the reservation. The doctrinal differences reflect disagreement as 
to the value of compulsory jurisdiction relative to unilateral inter-
pretations of international law in achieving a peaceful evolution of 
world public order. The majority did not enquire into the good faith 
of the French reservation. Its rule was that a state may decide for 
93. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(3), reprinted in [1972) Y.B.U.N. 
1190. 
94. Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, 1957 l.C.J. at 44-48. 
95. Id. at 62-63. 
96. Id. at 63; see also id. at 67-69 (J. Guerrero, (dissenting). 
97. Id. at 69 (J. Guerrero, dissenting). See id. at 71, 75-77 (J. Basdevant, dissenting); 
id. at 79, 94-95 (J. Reed, dissenting). 
98. Id. at 94. Accord Polish Postal Service in Danzig, 1925 P.C.l.J. ser. B, No. 11, at 
39 (Advisory Opinion of May 16, 1925); Competence of General Assembly regarding admis-
sion to the United Nations, 1950 l.C.J. 4, 8 (Advisory Opinion of Mar. 3, 1950). 
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itself what matters it will submit to third party or multilateral over-
view. Article XXI allows action which the acting state considers 
necessary for its national security. While the action must be taken 
in good faith, it is doubtful whether the element of good faith could 
be made the subject of judicial review. 
In the GATT context, the withholding of information which 
contributes to trade liberalisatio~, albeit at some harm to national 
security, will not always concord with the smooth, pacific allevia-
tion of trade disputes.99 In Articles XXII and XXIII, the GATT em-
phasises consultative dispute resolution. For the process to be ef-
fective, frank disclosures and full discussion of the issues is required. 
Withholding information on security grounds ~an hinder this 
process. 
Similarly, clause (b) excepts action taken by a state subjectively 
considered to be "necessary" for that state's self-protection. This 
clause does not, on its face, admit action to assist an ally or action 
which is desirable yet not necessary. The selection of these words 
suggests that a state is to endeavour to act in the manner least 
disruptive of international trade. Non-military emergencies,100 
defense supplies even in a non-weapons category101 and the inputs 
to the nuclear weapons cycle102 are included in the subject matter 
of this clause. States are given a broad scope for actions taken in 
self-protection. A supplier of natural resources such as iron ore and 
uranium would want to restrict supply to nations which might pro-
cess these inputs for weapons manufacture and use the weapons 
against the original supplier.103 
Finally, clause (c) excepts action mandated by the UN Security 
Council and possibly the General Assembly104 to keep peace.105 The 
example of sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965 would fall into this 
category.106 Leaving such a broad exception for unilateral interpreta-
tion runs the risk that the exception will be invoked in a manner 
99. GATT Doc. L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982). 
100. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 39, art. XXl(b)(iii). 
101. Id. art. XXl(b)(ii). 
102. Id. art. XXl(b)(i). 
103. Comments of the Australian Delegate, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/SR.40(2) at 9 (1947); U.N. 
Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/12 at 24 (GATT travaux prepatoires). 
104. JACKSON 1969, supra note 65, at 748. 
105. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 36, 39-50. 
106. See, e.g., 21 U.N. SCOR (1340th mtg) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/232 (1966). 
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inconsistent with the object and purpose of the GATT and without 
regard to the collective interest in international peace and security. 
This risk is an Achilles heel of the GA TT. 
Amending Part I of the GATT, which contains the MFN obliga-
tion of unanimity, 107 to allow single states to apply the principle only 
at those times when a self-perceived threat to national security is 
absent, seems overly permissive of unilateral suspensions of MFN. 
Indeed, Article XXI does not literally prevent suspension or ter-
mination of MFN to states to which the perceived threat is not 
sourced. This seems to be a particularly dangerous loophole. Never-
theless, the loophole persists. Such action, would, however, be an 
impediment to attaining an objective of the GATT: trade on the 
basis of MFN, and a valid basis for complaint under Article XXIII. 
E. THE SCOPE AND SUBJECT MATTER OF GATT ARTICLE XX! 
The scope and subject matter of Article XXI was raised by 
Czechoslovakia in the abovementioned complaint against the United 
States. To Czechoslovakia, the subject matter of Article XXI was 
"arms, ammunition and implements of war and other goods and 
materials for purposes of supplying a military establishment" and 
items of that genus. Because the U.S. definition of "war material" 
covered all goods for which the significant disclosure requirements 
for an export licence were not satisfied, it was argued by 
Czechoslovakia to be too indefinite a condition to pass muster. The 
commodities controlled were but 200 items of a list of 3,000 classified 
exports.108 The United States did not, in its reply, clarify its legal 
definition of goods covered by Article XXL Still, at the twenty-
second meeting of the Contracting Parties in 1949, the British, 
Cuban, and Pakistani representatives all supported the U.S. posi-
tion that the definition of goods in Article XXI covered dual-use 
items (which could be diverted from peaceful to hostile uses) and 
that that definition was a matter for each state to determine for 
itself.109 
Czechoslovakia's commitment to free trade, being herself a 
socialist rather than market economy, may be questionable. Never-
theless, the interpretation of Article XXI proferred by the 
107. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 39, art. XXX. 
108. GATT Doc. CP.3/SR.20 at 8. 
109. Id. at 4. 
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Czechoslovakian representative, Mr. Augenthalier, seems less con-
ducive to autarky and disorder.110 However, a more restrictive in-
terpretation would be rendered unworkable without a commitment 
from the militarily more powerful Western nations to objective 
rules. In deciding against the Czech complaint, the approach taken 
accorded the GATT no impact upon the development of pre-existing 
law. Permitting each state to follow an autarkic security policy 
without overview left the Article XXI exception open to abuse. The 
floodgates had been opened. An element of entropy had been in-
troduced into a system whose stability depended upon effective con-
sultations to resolve disputes. GATT rules could effectively be 
ignored on "security" grounds. On March 11, 1953, Peru restricted 
imports from non-market economies as a political measure. Article 
XXI was relied upon in support.111 After lengthy consultations and 
reviews, the decree was lifted on August l, 1967.112 The loophole 
established by the earlier decision was given full play. 
In 1959, the United States began limiting oil imports, osten-
sibly for national security reasons.113 Though not raised in the GATT 
context, the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba in 1962.114 would also 
seem to utilise the loophole. 
At the sixteenth session of the Contracting Parties in 1960, 
the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Malaya and Australia reported 
on the relaxation of import restrictions.115 Restrictions maintained 
under Articles XX and XXI were considered a distinct category 
whose bounds remained beyond regulations and undefined.116 A year 
later, Ghana invoked Article XXI openly relying upon the loophole 
which emerged from the United States-Czechoslovakia dispute.117 
Ghana considered that Portugal's involvement in the war in Angola 
threatened peace in Africa. A perceived threat to African peace 
was equated with a danger to the essential security interest of 
110. Cf, McDougal, International Law and the Future, 50 Mrss. L.J. 259, 310-14 (1980). 
111. GATT Doc. SR.9/27 at 10 (1955). 
112. See GATT Doc. L/2844 (1967). 
113. GATT Doc. L/1774 at 9 (May 21, 1962). 
114. Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962), reprinted in 76 Stat. 1446 (1962). 
115. GATT Doc. SR.16/5 at 56 et passim (June 13, 1960). 
116. Id. at 56 (Mr. Jardine for the United Kingdom); id. at 57 (Mr. de Bruyne for the 
Federation of Malaya). 
117. GATT Doc. SR.19/12 at 196 (Dec. 12, 1961). 
25
Knoll: International Economic Law
Published by SURFACE, 1984
592 Syr. J. lnt'l L. & Com. [Vol. 11:567 
Ghana. That the threat to Ghana was political more than military 
was considered no objection to the validity of Ghana's invocation 
of Article XXL Ghana did not, however, oppose the full member-
ship in the GATT at that time being proposed for Portugal. The 
view seems to have been taken by Ghana that bringing Portugal 
into the GATT fold and applying Article XXI would be progressive 
in both economic and political terms. The trend towards entropy 
continued. In 1962, Australia declined to notify its restrictions on 
ships as required by then residual-restrictions-reporting-
requirements because these restrictions were "applied pursuant to 
article XXL" 118 
None of these claims were questioned or reviewed to test the 
validity of the reliance on Article XXL Not until November 1982, 
did the Contracting Parties as a whole recognise that the excep-
tion was in need of limitation. Initial procedural guidelines were 
announced and a formal interpretation heralded. States were to be 
"as fully informed as possible," "subject to the exception in clause 
(a)" of action taken under Article XXL 119 The decision is significant 
because it publicly noted the potentially disruptive effects of trade 
restrictions grounded upon Article XXI. Being a first step, the deci-
sion was expressed in tentative, hortatory language. The pressure 
to reverse the entropic effects of the now standing interpretation 
of Article XXI has lately come to a head following the recently com-
pleted investigation of Nicaragua's complaint against U.S. import 
restrictions on Nicaraguan sugar. 
The Ministerial Declaration of 1982,120 which sought to dampen 
the damages of the literal construction of Article XXI, was reported-
ly referred to by Nicaragua. Nicaragua would no doubt have con-
strued the U.S. action as contrary to the spirit of that Declaration. 
Although the Nicaragua-El Salvador border disturbances could 
legitimately be viewed as a threat to the national security of El 
Salvador, an ally of the United States, any threat to the United 
States was, at most, remote. Article XXI permits a state to take 
action with respect to "its essential security interest."121 The pro-
tection of the interests of allies would not seem to ground invoca-
118. GA TT Doc. L/177 4 at 4 (May 21, 1962). 
119. GATT Doc. L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982). 
120. Id. at 295. 
121. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supa note 39, art. XXI (emphasis added). 
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tion of the national security exception. An attempt to except in-
tergovernmental agreements for military supply122 did not survive 
into the final text of the GATT.123 Further, the subject-matter or 
range of products to which Article XXI applies would need to be 
tested. Sugar would seldom be even an indirect input into defence 
preparedness.124 
Although the issue whether sugar was a commodity within the 
subject-matter of Article XXI was not faced in the U.S.-Nicaragua 
dispute before the GATT Panel, the U.S. position seems, at least 
at first sight, to be over broad. In the context of U.S. restrictions 
on the export of high technology, the EEC has protested that 
"foreign policy" as opposed to "national security" restrictions are 
contrary to the GA TT and also far from encouraging for the sup-
porters of the market exchange mechanism in international trade.125 
Extrapolating from this, the EEC would consider the U.S. action 
against Nicaragua similarly inexcusable. 
The U.S. position provides quite an analytical challange. It can-
not .be assumed that the American action was unjustifiable under 
the GATT without further enquiry. One can but speculate as to 
why Article XXI was not specifically invoked. The climate of U.S.-
Nicaraguan relations has been neither friendly nor peacful in re-
cent times. To discover whether the GATT is intended to apply 
in such an atmosphere, an examination of the travaux prepatoires 
of the GATT rather inconclusively suggests that the exception is 
limited to the subset of political disputes concerned with national 
security. Arguably, that exception is the only legal excuse provided 
for. 
It is worth nothing that pre-GATT U.S. reciprocal trade 
agreements generally contained exceptions for restriction of 
military supply, emergency and military self-protection, and the 
122. Report of the Joint Sub-committee, Fifth Committee: Inter-governmental Commodi-
ty Agreements and Sixth Committee: Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.5/14 and U.N. 
Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/45 (1948); Comment of Australian Delegation, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/12 
at 24-5 91948). 
123. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
124. Contra Comment of the Australian delegation, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/12 at 24-25; 
see infra text accompanying note 136. 
125. Aide-Memoire of the Commission of the European Communities and the Govern-
ment of France presented to the U.S. Department of State, Apr. 28, 1983 at 2-3 and of Mar. 
14, 1983 at 6. 
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maintenance of neutrality.126 These agreements influenced the U.S. 
suggestion for an International Trade Organization (ITO) which was 
made in September 1946, and included a draft charter which formed 
a basis for the first draft of the Preparatory Committee of the UN 
Conference on Trade and Employment. It included exception for 
the "adoption or enforcement" of measures inter alia 
c. relating to fissionable materials; 
d. relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements 
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is car-
ried on for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; 
e. in time of war or other emergency in international rela-
tions, relating to the protection of the essential security interests 
of a Member; .... 
k. undertaken in pursuance of obligations under the United 
Nations Charter for the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace and security .127 
In the Geneva draft of the Charter, produced at the Preparatory 
Committee's second session in 1947, Article 94 entitled "General 
Exceptions" included exceptions in the very terms of the ultimate 
GATT Article XXl.128 Earlier that year the Drafting Committee had 
prefaced the exceptions with the present opening words of Article 
XX.129 The same words were inserted into both the proposed ITO 
Charter130 and GATT131 agreements. The records of the Preparatory 
Committee show that the problem of interpreting subparagraph (e) 
was raised by the Dutch delegate. The Committee Chairman, His 
Excellency Erik Colban, suggested "that the spirit in which 
Members of the Organisation would interpret these provisions was 
the only guarantee against abuse."132 Consensual rather than 
126. See, e.g., Agreement between the United States of American and Mexico respecting 
reciprocal trade, Dec. 23, 1962, 57 Stat. 833, art. XVIl(f), (g)(h), at 850 E.A.S. No. 311; Agree-
ment and supplemental exchange of notes between the United States of America and Uruguay 
regarding reciprocal trade, July 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 1624, art. XV(f) (g) and (h), at 1637-38, 
E.A.S. No. 276. 
127. Dept. of State, Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organisation, Pub. 
No. 2598, reprinted in The Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of 
the United Nation's Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc.E/PC/T/33 at 60. 
128. See Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/186 at 56. 
129. See generally Report of the Drafting Committee of the Prepatory Committee of 
the United Nations Conference of Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T34 and Rev. 1. 
130. Id. at 31, art. 37. 
131. Id. at 77, art. XX. 
132. U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/SR/33 at 3. 
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unilateral regulation of the operation of the security exceptions was 
not pursued at the meeting. At this stage, the exception for non-
disclosure of security sensitive information was also added.133 
In 1948, a number of amendments to the exception were pro-
posed to the Fifth and Sixth Committees. They were not expressed 
in the final text. However, the record does not disclose whether 
they were substantively rejected or simply put in the "too hard" 
basket. They included: (1) A Joint Subcommittee of the Fifth and 
Sixth Committees agreed to except intergovernmental agreements 
for essential military supplies and the liquidation of military 
stockpiles.134 (2) Australia was concerned to see that any goods, 
whether directly or indirectly used for military purposes, be 
covered. The example given was iron ore, a raw material for most 
weapons systems and for whose supply Australia was a major 
source.135 One might speculate whether, had the export of sugar been 
considered the word "any" would have been qualified.136 (3) Costa 
Rica proposed to specifically exempt tariff readjustments made 
necessary by currency fluctuations and to add an exception for the 
maintenance of state monopolies.137 This was withdrawn in the light 
of discussion of other charter provisions.138 (4) India proposed a broad 
exception for state action in support of essential non-military, 
political interests. The strained relations between India and the 
Republic of South Africa were cited as a subject of the proposed 
exception.139 Iraq made a separate yet similar proposal.140 (5) Egypt 
sought specific exception for "severance of diplomatic relations or 
existence of a state of belligerency ."141 This was presumably 
133. Id. at 4. 
134. See generally Report of the Joint Sub-Committee, Fifth Committee: Intergovern-
mental Commodity Agreement; Sixth Committee: Organization U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.5/14 
(1948) and U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/45 (1948); Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Sixth 
Committee: Organization U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.5/93 (1948). The Australian delegation, in 
particular, pressed for a wide exception covering supply to both a primary nation's defense 
establishments and those of its allies. See Comment of the Australian delegation, supra note 
124. 
135. See Comment of the Australian Delegation, supra note 124. 
136. See Comment of the Australian Delegation, supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
137. Id. 
138. See.Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94) U.N. Doc.E/CONF.2/C.6/93 at 1 (1948). 
139. See Comment of the Australian Delegation, supra note 124. 
140. Iraq Amendment to Article 94 (General Exceptions) U .N. Doc. 
E/CONF.2/C.6/12/Add.9 (1947). 
141. Annotated Draft Agenda U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/12 at 26 (1947). 
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designed to cover the gap in Arab-world relations with Israel. It 
too was withdrawn prior to the establishment of the 
subcommittee.142 
In reviewing the subcommittees' reports, M. de Gaiffier of 
Belgium suggested that only military security rather than national 
security should be the scope of the exception.143 The French text, 
"ordre Militaire," may have been read to suggest that military in-
terference with trade was at the hub of the exception. This sug-
gestion was quickly withdrawn following opposition from the British, 
Chilean, American and Costa Rican delegates.144 Poland on the other 
hand opposed provision for unilateral measures for political reasons 
in the commercial field. 145 
The compromise in the final text is broader in scope than an 
exception for military matters might be, but it does not extend to 
political sanctions not primarily protective of the sanctioning na-
tion's own security. The apparent confinement of the exception to 
matters of only national security concerns confirmed by the travaux 
prepatoires does not appear to have influenced the conduct of the 
more powerful nations led by the United States. Without the sup-
port of dominant states, customary law, as regards both the 
elements of usage and obligation necessary to giving a treaty norm 
creating effect, does not appear to have crystallized. The travaux 
prepatoires do not register a consensus upon the more closely 
defined issues of Article XXL Although information flows, as well 
as the movement of goods could be validly restricted, the limita-
tion of scope and subject-matter to the subset of political issues 
encapsulated in the description "national security" was not given 
an element of specificity. Some states, notably Australia, saw the 
relevant items of trade to which Article XXI could be applied rather 
broadly. There was no decision to approach this definitional issue 
on a multilateral basis. Nevertheless, the principle of multilateral 
trade regulation does not automatically translate from peacetime 
to periods of crisis. 
The effect of hostilities upon the obligation to accord MFN 
treatment has even recently been placed in the "too hard" basket 
142. See Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94) U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/93 at 1 (1948). 
143. Summary Record of the Nineteenth Meeting, Sixth Committee U.N. Doc. 
E/CONF.2/C.5/SR.19 at 1 (1947). 
144. Id. at 2. 
145. Id. at 4. 
30
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1984], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss3/5
1984] International Economic Law 597 
by the International Law Commission.146 It seems that commercial 
treaties generally do not survive a declaration of war.147 This is so 
because performance of obligations becomes impossible, or at least 
of lower priority, than the war effort. Survival interests take 
precedence. In a cold war situation, however, the climate is one of 
crisis, but it is unlikely to involve survival interests in an objec-
tive sense. While states may struggle for influence over others in 
the course of a cold war, their very survival as states is generally 
not at risk. If national security is construed narrowly to mean such 
survival, the Article XXI exception may not validly be invoked to 
deal with cold war pressures. If, however, a wider construction is 
to be preferred, GA TT obligations may validly be departed from 
in dealing with cold war crises. 
Given that the Protocol of Provisional Application permits 
withdrawal from the GATT upon sixty days notice, non-withdrawal 
from the GATT indicates a willingness to be bound by the GATT 
upon the resolution of the crisis. So, on either approach to Article 
XXI, it seems that GATT treaty obligations are designed to sur-
vive a cold war situation. The content of the rule during a cold war 
does appear to have been flexibly interpreted. GATT obligations 
have generally been modified but not abrogated in crises short of 
war. 
F. THE IMPACT OF SECURITY CONCERNS ON THE MOST 
FAVOURED NATION OBLIGATION 
In the Czechoslovakia-United States dispute, the United States 
argued that Article XXI did admit the suspension of MFN.148 The 
Cuban and Pakistani delegates on the GATT Panel explicitly agreed 
that Article XXI did admit suspension of MFN.149 Czechoslovakia, 
on the other hand, did not concede that security restrictions 
necessarily had to be applied in a discriminatory manner. 
The issue, not fully dealt with during the discussion in the 
GATT, appears to be whether it is trade in certain products or trade 
146. Report of the International Law Commission on its Thirtieth Session (1978] 2, Pt. 
2, Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 71, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/33/10 (1978). (Commentary to Draft Article 27 
on the Most Favoured Nation Clause). 
147. See J. STONE, supra note 23. 
148. Contra GATT Doc. CP.3/SR.22 at 4-5. 
149. Id. at 5 (Mr. Herrera-Arango of Cuba), at 6 (Mr. Hasnie of Pakistan). 
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with certain countries, regardless of the products involved, which 
is to be restricted in a valid exercise of Article XXL If the former, 
then discriminatory restrictions are illegitimate. If the latter, they 
are quite valid. The ultimate rejection of the Czech complaint 
impliedly tilted the balance in favour of the latter view. 
However, in view of the centrality of the MFN clause to the 
GA TT and the absence of explicit decision on this point, the ques-
tion cannot be said to have been resolved. The problem also bubbled 
beneath the surface in the recent U.S.-Nicaragua dispute. 
The reduction of Nicaragua's quota was an economic sanction 
implemented for political reasons. It accorded Nicaragua treatment 
less favourable than the United States Schedule of Concessions 
under Article II of the GATT. Indeed, for the 1983-84 year, 
Nicaragua had anticipated being able to ship 61,950 short tons to 
the United States, its main export market. Worse still, GATT Con-
tracting Parties shipping sugar to the United States now had a 
relatively smaller share of the U.S. sugar market because the na-
tions to which the Nicaraguan quota had been reallocated were not 
party to the GATT. Although only 2.1 percent of U.S. imports, the 
sugar trade was an important component of Nicaragua's export 
trade. Among other arguments,150 a violation of Article XIII was 
alleged. 
Article XIII prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality 
in applying quantitative restrictions. Even where quotas are im-
posed, MFN is upheld. Under the GATT every Contracting Party, 
for any particular product, is to treat every other Contracting Party 
as favourably as it does its most favoured trading partner. A single 
tariff level is to apply to imports whatever their source. With 
respect to quotas no foreign supplier is to suffer more than any 
other as a result of the imposition of quotas. 
Since the seventeenth century, MFN clauses have been in-
cluded in commercial treaties.151 MFN involves a claim to rights 
available to another state whether or not that other state exercises 
its entitlement. For when the Nicaraguan sugar quota was real-
located, GATT members could claim a right to treatment at least 
150. Nicaragua also claimed violation of art. XI and Part IV of the GATT. 
151. Report on the Most Favoured Nation Clause, [1978) 2, Pt. 1, Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 
5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/309 (Nikolai Ushakov, Special Rapporteur). See McGOVERN, supra note 
65, at 197. 
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as favourable as that accorded to El Salvador, Honduras and Costa 
Rica whether or not those states were, in fact, able to fill the 
Nicaraguan quota. Had no such reallocation occurred, the MFN stan-
dard would not have shifted. Although the shift in the MFN stan-
dard has not resulted in claims by other GA TT parties, the realloca-
tion, as a step additional to the cutback in the Nicaraguan quota, 
does not appear to be a breach of MFN which is excusable under 
Article XXL Reference to GATT obligations appears to have been 
outweighed by political considerations in constructing the sanction. 
The United States' focus was not upon restricting sugar im-
ports as a means of safeguarding its national security, rather it was 
upon reallocating a GATT member's quota to other suppliers whose 
political bent was preferred by the United States. The United States 
saw such a measure as beyond the jurisdiction of the GATT Con-
tracting Party even though its fellow GATT members were losing 
the benefits of MFN in the sugar trade. As a precedent, the ac-
tions of the United States are not conducive to healthy operation 
of the MFN principle. 
G. THE SETTLEMENT OF GATT DISPUTES INVOLVING SECURITY 
CONCERNS 
This section examines the relationship between GATT Articles 
XXI and XXIII. Can an action excusable under Article XXI never-
theless constitute a "nullification or impairment" for which a GATT 
remedy is to be had? Phrased differently, does the valid invoca-
tion of Article XXI excuse the invoking state from compliance with 
GATT dispute resolution mechanisms? At the Geneva sessions 
drafting the charter for the proposed ITO, the answer was that ac-
tion taken to protect the national security could give rise to a 
remediable complaint.152 After all, restriction of exports to a target 
state forces the target to pay more for its imports by virtue of the 
volume of available supply falling relative to demand. Restriction 
of imports from a target results in the target being paid less for 
its exports as demand falls relative to the available supply. Cut-
ting off finance or aid to a target state reduces the target's ability 
to develop its own industries. Unable to produce at home, the target 
becomes dependent on supply from abroad. 
However, just as Rhodesia circumvented most of the economic 
sanctions placed upon it for over a decade, so can most target states 
152. E/PC/T/A/SR.33 at 5; see also JACKSON 1969, supra note 65, at 748. 
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mitigate, but not wholly escape, the ill effects of actions taken pur-
suant to Article XXI.153 The availability of mitigation does not 
negative a legal claim of "nullification or impairment." Also, it mat-
ters little to the affected state that exports or imports are the sub-
ject of unwarranted action. Unilateral restrictions for national 
security reasons may seldom be anticipated by the target state.154 
Whether or not excusable under Article XXI, the target, as in the 
case of Nicaragua discussed above, can usually show a primafacie 
nullification or impairment. The use of quantitative restrictions or 
a violation of a GATT obligation shifts the burden of providing 
damage away from the target state. 
The sanctioning state needs to then excuse its action.155 In the 
U.S.-Nicaragua sugar dispute, the United States elected not to 
follow this procedure but rather declined to accept the jurisdiction 
of the GA TT Panel over an action taken for security reasons. The 
Panel felt duty bound to find in Nicaragua's favour. It did not con-
done the U.S. stance of declining the GATT's jurisdiction in a case 
where an overt economic measure violated a GATT obligation. 
In the Czechoslovakia-U.S. case, the United States did defend 
its sanctions which did not so much ban exports as place a heavy 
administrative burden on persons seeking an export licence. The 
complainant state, faced with the respondent's reliance on Article 
XXI, has little by way of relief to look forward to until the crisis 
has passed. 
To the Czech claim that the information requested by the of-
ficials administering the export controls had been supplied, the 
Cuban representative on the Panel replied that the rigour and 
stringency of those officials was not a ground for complaint to the 
GATT. The appellate procedures of U.S. law were designed to con-
strain excesses.156 Any misapplication of the controls to goods 
neither imported into Czechoslovakia for war purposes (nor other-
wise covered by Article XXI) should be the subject of further direct 
153. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 
29-30 (1983). 
154. See Report adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties on Apr. 3, 1950 on The 
Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, pursuant to a complaint by Chile, GATT Doc. 
DP.4/39, II BISD 188 (1952), Report adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties on Feb. 26, 
1955 on Swedish Anti-dumping Duties, pursuant to a complaint by Italy, GATT Doc. L/428, 
3 BISD 81 (1955). 
155. See JACKSON 1969, supra note 65, at 182. 
156. E/PC/T/A/SR.33 at 5. 
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negotiations between the United States and Czechoslovakia rather 
than of a GATT investigation.157 
The rigorous manner in which U.S. export controls are enforced 
has continued to cause concern in the international arena. The pend-
ing amendments to the Export Administration Act158 have met with 
sharp criticism from both inside and outside the United States. For 
example, the EEC has protested the "negative implications ... for 
international trade" of the proposed increase in the administrative 
burden upon .holders of export licences.159 Governmental interference 
with technological data flows has drawn criticism from the scien-
tific community.160 A heightened intensity of customs inspections 
under the export controls of "Operation Exodus" has done little 
to enamour customs officials to American business.161 
In contributing to the GA TT Panel discussion of the Czech 
claim against the United States, the United Kingdom representative 
hedged, arguing that "every country must have the last resort on 
questions relating to its own security. On the other hand, the Con-
tracting Parties should be cautious not to take any step which might 
have the effect of undermining the General Agreement."162 The deci-
sion of the Contracting Parties was that the United States "had 
not failed to carry out its obligations under the Agreement through 
its administration of the issue of export licences."163 So, it seems 
that rigorously enforced licence procedures may withstand a com-
plaint that they constitute a nullification or impairment.164 
The U.S. Department of Commerce has recognised that "should 
the security exception by invoked, it could not necessarily foreclose 
a successful challenge under Article XXIII by G.A.T.T. members 
claiming impairment of tariff concessions."165 The Commerce Depart-
ment view may not represent the U.S. viewpoint if and when the 
157. Id. at 6-7. 
158. H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 Cong. Rec. S4183 (1983); and S.979, 129 Cong. 
Rec. H3660. 
159. See Aide-Memoire, supra note 42. 
160. See, e.g., Zonderman, Policing High-Tech Exports, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1983, § 6 
(Magazine), at 100 passim. 
161. Id. 
162. See supra note 156, at 7. 
163. Id. at 9. 
164. At least insofar as the GATT discussion and decision influence future decisions. 
165. United States Department of Commerce, The Effect of Imports of Nuts, Bolts and 
Large Screws on the National Security (Feb. 1983) at 57. 
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GATT Contacting Parties require the United States to offer com-
pensation for action excusable, yet causing a nullification or impair-
ment of GATT benefits to other members. However, the United 
States does not have the domestic legal authority to pay 
compensation.166 
H. DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
From the perspective of a state on the receiving end of sanc-
tions, the principles involved are to be viewed similarly for export 
controls and for import controls.167 Although the economic 
parameters differ, the legal limits to Article XXI action will differ 
little between import and export restraints. 
Where export controls are in place, they are generally applied 
to goods for which demand exceeds supply. To be effective, a 
withholding of exports cannot afford to be mitigated from alter-
native sources of supply. Being a major supplier of high technology 
items in ever increasing demand around the world, the United 
States can use restrictions on the export of "know-how" to pressure 
other states. This is particularly so in cases where the U.S. need 
for export markets is exceeded by overseas demand for U.S. know-
how. Where an import control is applied, an excess of supply over 
demand is conducive to effectiveness. The glut in world sugar 
markets also aided U.S. sanctions against Nicaragua. 
I. WAIVER OF ACTIONS TAKEN TO PROTECT SECURITY 
GATT Article XXV allows the Contracting Parties to waive 
any GATT obligation in exceptional circumstances not otherwise 
provided for. A two-thirds majority of votes cast which must in-
clude over half the GATT membership is required to approve a 
waiver. Waivers may be for a limited duration but need not be.168 
In 1951, the United States suspended MFN towards the Soviet 
bloc states, an action broader than the earlier restriction of export 
licences. On this occasion, the Contracting Parties ruled that the 
U.S. and Czech Governments "shall be free to suspend, each with 
respect to the other, the obligations of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade."169 This ruling would seem to reflect the classical 
166. Id. at 57. 
167. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
168. See e.g., Waiver to the United States regarding the restrictions under the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, 3 BISD 32 (1955); cf GATT Doc. L/339, 3 BISD 141 (1955). 
169. GATT, II BISD 36 (1952). 
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legal position wherein the only regulation of international economic 
sanctions was each state's desire to be seen as a good faith partici-
pant in its relations with other states. The ruling operated as a 
waiver of U.S. GATT obligations to Czechoslovakia but did not con-
form to GA TT Article XXV(5). 
It does seem that the waiver authority in GATT Article XXV 
was not invoked because of some parties' doubts as to the very 
relevance of the GATT to a political dispute. The cold war atmosphere 
clearly pervaded the matter and the GA TT Panel's investigation. 
A similar climate surrounded the U.S.-Nicaragua dispute before the 
GA TT Panel in 1983-84. 
Differing from the Panel's approach in the dispute between the 
United States and Czechoslovakia, even an informal waiver of GATT 
obligations as between the United States and Nicaragua, was not 
examined by either the Panel or Contracting Parties. This difference 
may have been influenced by the Ministerial Declaration of 
November 30, 1982.110 The initial step back towards multilateral 
rather than bilateral or unilateral interpretive mechanisms having 
been made, the Contracting Parties did not desire to condone a sanc-
tion of doubtful legality. Perhaps a more limited role for waiver 
of GATT obligations, even if outside the lines of Article XXV(5), 
is in the offing. One that recognises that the waiver should indeed 
be limited to exceptional circumstances not otherwise provided for 
in, for example, Article XXL 
J. JURISDICTIONAL DEFENSE ES EN ATTERNATIVE TO ARTICLE XX! 
If one were to apply the law on self-preservation in the economic 
arena, the legal reasons why the United States viewed its action 
as justifiable would need to be based upon an illegal act by 
Nicaragua validly construed as opposable to the United States. The 
U.S. redistribution of Nicaragua's sugar quota then would be area-
sonable proportionate reprisal. Dr. Alan Gerson, for example, has 
argued that because Nicaragua was engaged in the subversion of 
El Salvador, there is an illegal act to which El Salvador may validly 
respond with U.S. assistance. The legality of the U.S. action is derived 
from the legality of the El Salvadoran response.171 
170. GATT Doc. L/5426. 
171. Gerson, U.S. Acts Lawfully, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1984, at A31, col. 1. 
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The U.S. action involved both military measures, such as in-
volvement with the laying of mines in Nicaraguan ports, and 
economic measures, such as the restriction of sugar imports. As 
to the former, the matter has been partially litigated before the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). The United States chose not 
to rely upon its reservation to ICJ jurisdiction, known generally 
as the Conolly Amendment.172 This is surprising, given the Court's 
approval of this type of reservation in the Franco-Norwegian Loans 
Case.173 Instead, an abortive attempt was made to modify the 
American acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction. The ICJ did not pass upon 
the validity of this modification in ordP-ring, as a preliminary 
measure, the cessation and non-resumption of the blocking of or 
endangering access to Nicaraguan ports by the United States.174 The 
ICJ has not declared the U.S. action to be an illegal use of force. 
The Court did reaffirm the principles applicable to the use of force 
and recommended against further action which might aggravate 
the dispute.175 The United States claimed it had already ceased the 
mining and declared its intention to abide by the ruling.176 It has 
also continued to support El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras 
in their dispute with Nicaragua. Notably these are the very states 
to whom the Nicaraguan sugar quota was "reallocated." The sup-
port has continued to include military and economic measures. 
Before the GATT Panel the United States argued that because 
its action was not economically motivated, the dispute could not 
be resolved within the field of relations covered by the GATT. 
Arguments with respect to the discriminatory nature of the restric-
tions were reserved by the United States. The Panel found that 
the U.S. action constituted illegal discrimination and concluded that 
the United States was in breach of its obligations having violated 
GA TT Article XIII. It did not decide the other issues raised by 
Nicaragua. The effect of both the GATT Panel and ICJ findings, 
contrary to American submissions, has not been a cessation of U.S. 
involvement nor a return to stability in the region. In the present 
172. See 1978-1979 I.C.J.Y.B. 56 (1979). 
173. Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. 9. For a discussion of this case see 
supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
174. Text of World Court's Ruling on Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1984, at A9, col. 1. 
175. Id. 
176. Court's Ruling Acceptable, State Department Declares, id. at A8, col. 1. 
T178. Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94) U.N. Doc.E/CONF.2/C.6/93 at 3-4 (1948). 
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absence of a ruling by the ICJ upon the ultimate legitimacy of U.S. 
involvement, one can conclude only that the GATT Contracting Par-
ties consider the U.S. in violation of at least its GATT obligations. 
The overall legality of its action may also fall under a cloud given 
the thrust of the provisional measures adopted by the ICJ. 
Insofar as an economic body was not an appropriate forum, the 
American submissions derive some support from the GATT travaux 
prepatoires, in particular, the records of the Subcommittee of the 
Fifth and Sixth Committees dealing with this question. The Sub-
committee was overall of the view that political matters including 
politically motivated economic measures were within the jurisdic-
tion of the UN, the jurisdiction of which the proposed ITO ought 
not interfere.177 Although regulation of such measures through the 
proposed ITO was disavowed, regulation by the United Nations was 
considered by the Subcommittee to be preferable to unilateral 
governance.178 
In the Sixth Committee, the Subcommittee's position was the 
subject of some debate. The Australian, Belgian and Swedish 
delegates considered that the ITO should not be left without capaci-
ty to act upon economic measures taken for political reasons where 
the UN did not or would not involve itself.179 The delegates of the 
United Kingdom, Greece, the United States, South Africa, Iraq and 
India argued that a technical, economic organisation ought to decline 
jurisdiction over political matters. Indeed, Mr. Holloway of South 
Africa remarked, "[i]f an economic measure which led to a complaint 
was related to a political dispute which was itself not important 
enough to come before the United Nations, there was a presump-
tion that the political aspects of the dispute were not significant."180 
Perhaps the essence of the debate is best summarised in the 
remark of Mr. Paiva of Brazil. He suggested that declining jurisdic-
tion for the ITO provided a pragmatic and generally acceptable solu-
tion for states most concerned with the problem.181 These nations 
could not be coerced to submit to a jurisdiction upon whose 
177. Report of Subcommittee I (Article 94) U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/93 at 3-4 (1948). 
178. Statement of the Chairman of the Sub-Committee I U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/104. 
179. See Summary Record of the Thirty-Seventh Meeting, Sixth Committee U.N. Doc. 
E/CONF.2/C/6/SR at 3-5, (1948). 
180. Id. at 4. 
181. Id. at 5. 
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parameters agreement could not be reached. Even so, these dif-
ferences of opinion related directly to the ITO, which was stillborn. 
The GATT has become a reluctant replacement. Not all states are 
willing to submit security concerns to multilateral regulation. The 
powerful nations reserve unto their unilateral governance a 
category of political questions which is broader than the exception 
ultimately granted for "security" measures. Yet the exception for 
intergovernmental security arrangements between allies did not 
survive through to the ultimate text of the GATT. The non-provision 
for excepting the actions of allies to protect each other's security 
cannot be taken to involve a prohibition of such actions. The posi-
tion of the more powerful states was that an ITO ought to decline 
to decide political questions. This stance effectively vetoed the 
evolution of a customary norm of prohibition and left the inter-
pretative problems of Article XXI to remain unresolved in the 
GA TT context. 
K. THE FUTURE OF ARTICLE XX! 
States practice under Article XXI is in a parlous condition. The 
warning given by Professor Jackson in 1969 still rings true: 
The existence of practice that is inconsistent with legal rules, par-
ticularly when such divergent practice results in profit of one kind 
or another, usually increases the incentive for other departures 
from the rule and, therefore, the number of other departures. Con-
sequently, one of the values of a legal rule - the enhancement of 
stability and predictability- is lost.182 
The value of Article XXI in stabilising the trade liberalisation pro-
cess even when the security of trading nations is threatened has 
depreciated ever since the last cold war. The de facto waiver of 
GATT obligations as between Czechoslovakia and the United States 
may have been a pragmatic solution for the times. Jurisprudentially, 
it opened the floodgates for unilateral actions which are only osten-
sibly excusable under Article XXL 
Having sought a wider forum than the economic institution into 
which the GATT evolved, the U.S.-Nicaragua dispute went before 
182. JACKSON 1969, supra note 65, at 757. 
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the International Court of Justice. In an expeditiously rendered in-
terim decision, this forum subtly condemned the military action of 
the United States in the dispute. So, on two fronts, the United 
States has been found wanting in the eyes of the law. Arguments 
which present the U.S. actions as legitimate reprisals have been 
put forth by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam.183 These 
arguments were not developed before the GA TT Panel, nor did they 
form the basis of the U.S. case before the ICJ. The United States 
was unwilling to submit its actions to either the GATT Panel or 
judicial scrutiny. 
In the immediate post-World War II period, the United States 
provided constructive leadership in espousing the value of rules 
for dealing with environmental, telecommunications, human rights, 
economic and security issues. Nations with diverse economic struc-
tures were persuaded of the mutual benefits in developing con-
vergent policies.184 The United States remains a world leader. By 
not relying upon the very principles it helped develop to justify 
or excuse its actions, the system of rules is weakened. As the ex-
ample of a leading nation showing disregard for legal forums is 
followed by others, divergent policies emerge and entropy sets in. 
The U.S. position has been heavily criticised even within the United 
States.185 
A sense of vulnerability is fostered when the leading market 
economy prefers protection of traditional values to the gains from 
trade. The resurgence of reciprocity as a key trade mechanism for 
the United States may well be in the offing. Contemporaneous with 
introverted national policies is the intermediate state of nature be-
tween war and peace. Introversion, protectionism and a cold war 
climate seem to feed upon one another while awaiting a superior 
initiative to break the cycle and restore an open world economy 
and peace. Realisation of the consequences of a deteriorating 
political climate often provides the impetus for reversal of the pro-
cess of entropic autarky. 
183. Tolchin, U.S. Aide Defends Mining Without Acknowledging It, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 
1984, at AlO, col. 1; cf; Ledeen, When Security Preempts the Rule of Law, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
16, 1984, at A21, col. 1. 
184. Nimitz, Respect World Law, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1984, at Al9, col. 2. 
185. See id. Ullman, World Court Evasion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1984, at A27, col. l, 
Tolchin, supra note 183 (giving a summary of American Congressional opinions). 
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V. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
A. NATIONAL SECURITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE IMF 
In making a comparison of GATT practice with the practice 
of the IMF, it is important to remember that, although the institu-
tions were conceived together, they have generally engaged in little 
visible cooperation. The conventional wisdom that trade and 
payments problems should be kept as distinct as possible appears 
to have survived repeated challenge.186 
The IMF is designed to regulate the actions of governments 
affecting exchange rates. It has three tiers in its structure. The 
Board of Governors, upon which all member states are represented, 
usually meets annually. This Board delegates most of its powers 
to the Executive Directors, known collectively as the Executive 
Board, who are responsible for the general operations of the IMF. 
The Managing Director and his staff conduct the daily operations 
of the IMF. 
The Articles of the International Monetary Fund have become 
the governing norms of international monetary law. Under Article 
VIIl(2)(a), currency restrictions upon current international transac-
tions require IMF approval. The decision is one for the Executive 
Board of the Fund.187 This Executive Board may be viewed as the 
Fund's key administrator, beneath the Board of Governors whose 
role is more one of policy-making. The Board of Governors passes 
by-laws with which the decision of the Executive Board must be 
consistent.188 The Executive Board usually acts by consensus. For-
mal votes, if taken, require a simple majority of weighted votes 
cast.189 
The imposition of restrictions for national security reasons 
came before the Board as the cold war between the United States 
and the Soviet Union built up in the 1950's. Whereas the Fund was 
responsible for currency restrictions even if not adopted for balance 
of payments reasons, it recognised its own lack of expertise in 
186. See, e.g., CLINE, Introduction and Summary, TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980's 13 (1983). 
187. 1.M.F. BY-LAWS s.15 (36th issue, 1979). 
188. J. GOLD, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 5 (1980) (IMF 
Pamphlet Series No. 32). 
189. Weighting is by a quota that is measured by contribution to the Fund and arguably 
proportionate to the perceived relative prominence of each nation's currency. See generally 
J. GOLD. VOTING MAJORITIES IN THE JUND (1977) (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 20). 
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evaluating security issues. The solution arrived at is contained in 
Executive Board Decision No. 144-(52/51).190 Pursuant to this deci-
sion, member countries imposing currency restrictions for securi-
ty reasons are required to notify the Fund not later than thirty 
days after imposition of the restrictions. Unless the Fund raises 
an objection within thirty days thereafter, the restriction is treated 
as approved, retrospective to the date of notification. The approval 
is effective for an indefinite time period. By contrast, restrictions 
taken for economic reasons are usually .only approved for limited, 
yet renewable periods. 
In December 1950, prior to Decision 144-(52/51), the United 
States notified the IMF of the imminent restriction of certain 
payments and transfers to China, North Korea and their nationals. 
Offering the opinion that the legality of the move was not for the 
IMF to decide, the United States made clear its disinclination to 
accept IMF regulation of its action. In 1951, Cuba notified the IMF 
of politically motivated restrictions of its own. The IMF adopted 
Decision 144-(52/51) to protect its political neutrality without ab-
dicating its regulatory duties in a cold war crisis climate. It effec-
tively condoned the U.S. and Cuban restrictions. 
Article VIIl(2)(b) makes restrictions approved under Article 
VIIl(2)(a) enforceable in the territories of any other member. So, 
whereas Article XXI of the GATT excuses defensive sanctions legal-
ly effective only to the extent of the claimant state's jurisdiction, 
this jurisdictional limit is overcome in the IMF context by giving 
approved restrictions international enforceability. The operation 
of this Article became the focus of world attention during the Iran-
ian assets freeze imposed by the United States. The freeze provides 
a useful vehicle for the analysis of the impact of security concerns 
upon international monetary law. The facts behind the legal strug-
gle are worth recounting. 
In response to the taking hostage of U.S. diplomats in Iran and 
in anticipation of attempts by Iran to undermine the strength of 
the U.S. dollar in international markets, the United States Depart-
ment of the Treasury, on November 14, 1979, froze all transactions 
in U.S. dollars to which the government of Iran and its subsidiary 
190. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 133 (8th issue, 1976). 
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units, including the central bank, were party .191 The central bank, 
Bank Markazi Iran, commenced litigation in London and Paris to 
force banks outside the United States to release Iranian U.S. dollar 
deposits to Bank Markazi. The correct construction of Article 
VII(2)(b) would have been at issue. The issues, however, were 
rendered moot by the successful mediation of Algeria in the 
dispute.192 Iranian funds were released in exchange for the hostages. 
B. IMF REVIEW OF THE SECURITY EXCEPTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW 
Sir Joseph Gold, Senior Consultant and formerly General 
Counsel and Director of the Legal Department of the IMF, considers 
any measure which directly regulates international monetary 
payments or transfers to be within the scope of Article VIII(2)(b).193 
Indeed, UN mandated actions are cited as measures within the scope 
of the Article.194 In 1979, the IMF approved a loan to Nicaragua. 
The Honorable Henry F. Reuss, Chairman of the Committee on 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, United States House of 
Representatives, criticised the decision for failing to take into ac-
count its political consequences. Secretary of the Treasury Blumen-
thal supported the decision of the U.S. appointed Executive Direc-
tor who voted in favour of the loan. Political considerations are not 
to be taken into account by the IMF whose international standing 
depends in part upon its non-interference in the political affairs of 
its member states.195 Secretary Blumenthal wrote: 
Members cannot be expected to fulfill their obligations to the l.M.F. 
and to the international community if their rights can be denied 
191. The regulations as first promulgated appear at 44 Fed. Reg. 65,956 (1979) and as 
amended at 45 Fed. Reg. 45,594 (1980). They were "lifted" to conform with and implement 
the Algeria-U.S.-Iran settlement on Feb. 24, 1981 retroactive to Jan. 19, 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 
14,330 (1981). 
192. See Agreement on the Release of the American Hostages, 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. No. 
2047 (Feb. 1981); Settlement of the Iran Hostage Crisis: Official Documents, 75 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 418 (1981); Iran-United States Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981). 
193. See, e.g., Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts-XV, 27 I.M.F. STAFF PAPERS 601, 
612-17 (1980). 
194. Id. See also GOLD, The Fund Agreement in the Courts-XIV, 26 I.M.F. STAFF PAPERS 
609 (1979). 
195. J. GOLD, supra note 189, at 59. This consideration is made explicit in art. IV(lO) of 
the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
("the World Bank"). See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, done Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134. 
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them on political grounds. The prospect of a smoothly functioning 
world economy, with responsible international behaviour in terms 
of economic and financial policy by I.M.F. member governments, 
would be greatly lessened. All nations would lose by the introduc-
tion of political disputes into the I.M.F ., and it would be a par-
ticularly grave error for the United States to lead the way.196 
611 
Although the thrust of Secretary Blumenthal's view would 
seem to require that politically tainted disputes be not resolved 
by the IMF, its result was not a "hands-off" approach by the IMF. 
Rather, there evolved a concrete decision to apply the standing tests 
to Nicaragua's loan application. These tests were of economic per-
formance criteria only. The decision had undeniable political con-
sequences just as inaction might have had. Nevertheless, it was a 
politically value-neutral application of legal rules which enhanced 
the IMF's statute as an international organisation actively pursu-
ing the goals of its charter.197 Sir Joseph Gold's analysis of Article 
VIII continues to be followed by the IMF .198 
Some academic commentators have supported a "hands off" 
approach. They argue that a control designed to pressure a foreign 
government into a policy shift rather than to ballast the currency 
of the state imposing the control is not "an exchange control regula-
tion" within the meaning of Article VIII(2)(b).199 They argue that 
the IMF is only concerned with actions taken to protect a curren-
cy from destabilising exchange fluctuations and not actions taken 
for other reasons. This view remains a minority view. 
Curiously, Decision 144-(52/51) was taken in the same cold war 
pressures that surrounded the adoption of a different and more per-
missive approach by the GATT in the U.S.-Czechoslovakia dispute.200 
By adopting objective criteria and ignoring the attempt to avoid 
196. House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Blumenthal, Replies to Con-
gressman Reuss' Criticism of IMF Loan to Nicaragua, News Release (Washington, D.C., June 
13, 1979). 
197. GOLD, supra note 188, at 66-67. 
198. Letter from George P. Nicoletopoulos, Director, Legal Department, International 
Monetary Fund to Professor Richard W. Edwards J., Professor of Law, University of Toledo 
(Jan. 9, 1981), reprinted in 75 AM. J. lNT'L L. 900-02 (1981). 
199. F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 444-45 (3d. ed. 1971) Krispis, Money in Private 
International Law, 120 A.D.l.R.C. 191, 293 (1967); Recent Development, The Iranian Assets 
Control Regulations and the International Monetary Fund: Are the Regulations "Exchange 
Control Regulations?" 4 B.C. lNT'L COMP. L. REV. 203 (1981). 
200. Compare the GATT Panel's approach in the later U.S.-Nicarague sugar dispute. 
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what was then still a new world of international economic law, IMF 
practice has promoted respect for its norms. The effectiveness of 
the norms depends upon the extent to which members are convinced 
that the norms promote their interests. The strength of Decision 
144-(52/51) lies in the clear procedure, consensually developed, for 
obtaining IMF approval with respect to restrictions prompted by 
security concerns. Nations seeking to enforce international currency 
restrictions enacted for security reasons are obliged to place the 
restrictions before Executive Board scrutiny for thirty days. The 
importance of such an obligation is explained by Sir Joseph Gold: 
If it is agreed that states are reluctant to incur international odium 
as a violator of obligations, a conclusion can be drawn for the for-
mulation of obligations. The greater the precision that can be given 
to obligations, the less likely members will be to engage in con-
duct in violation of them. The violation of a precise obligation will 
be obvious, and members will have little or no opportunity to argue 
that a violation is not occurring.201 
More subtly, international lending creates a dependancy bond 
between debtor and creditor. A comfortable monetary position pro-
tects a state from the influence of others. During the Suez crisis 
in 1956, Egypt, the Untied Kingdom and the United States 
restricted payments and transfers without notifying them to the 
IMF. British involvement in the unsuccessful military action to 
reopen the Suez ceased after the selling pressure against her cur-
rency was compounded by the refusal of the United States to de-
fend the pound.202 The United States was the one nation financial-
ly able to stabilise the pound in the absence of IMF approval. The 
United States deference to the IMF process sealed the fate of the 
pound. In the absence of IMF approval, Britain was unable to legally 
seek and obtain international cooperation for her restrictions. Her 
monetary position weakened: external influences had greater impact 
than would have otherwise been the case.203 It may be that expec-
tation of non-approval was one factor influencing the United 
Kingdom not to seek approval for its 1956 actions. 
201. J. Gow. supra note 189, at 32. 
202. H. THOMAS, SUEZ 146-47 (1967). 
203. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 117, 
287-88, 337 (1957); Favcett, The International Monetary Fund and International Law, 40 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT'L L. 32, 65 (1964). 
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The IMF loan to Nicaragua in 1979 was opposed in Congress 
partly in the hope of placing Nicaragua in a dependency relation 
with the United States for the key currency of trade, the U.S. dollar. 
By making itself the creditor of Nicaragua, the IMF made Nicaragua 
dependent instead upon an apolitical lender. 
In the case of the Iranian assets freeze, it had been widely 
publicized in the press that strategic withdrawals of U.S. dollar 
deposits around the world by Iran were being planned with the 
stated purpose of undermining the U.S. dollar.204 Protecting against 
this not only safeguarded the U.S. currency, but prevented a 
destabilisation of international monetary relations. The United 
States was not so much making Iran dependent upon its political 
foes for cash flow, but rather maintaining the stability of a world 
peace geared for U.S. dollar payments. 
No analogy can be borne with the imposition of sugar quotas 
against Nicaragua by the United States contrary to GATT Article 
XIII. That action was not conducive to the furtherance of friendly 
relations or at least not focal thereto. The standard for good faith 
action is necessarily a loose one. Still, the British currency restric-
tions during the Suez crisis and the U.S. sugar quota restriction 
are less persuasively conducive to international peace and securi-
ty than the Iranian assets freeze. 
Following World War II, the Eurodollar market evolved at least 
partly due to fears of an assets freeze in the then prevailing cold 
war climate. Governments of both East and West declined to keep 
their U.S. dollar funds in the names of their governments or cen-
tral banks in New York.205 By diversifying the location of their 
deposits, governments reduced the risk that an assets freeze by 
any one state would undermine their overall dealings. The failure 
of the revolutionary authorities in Iran to learn this lesson left the 
stage open for the crisis in international monetary law in 1979-81. 
The Iranian assets freeze required IMF approval because Ar-
ticle VIII(3) of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF involves the 
proscription of discriminatory currency restrictions. Article XIX(i) 
includes within the proscription: 
204. Pardieu, The Carter Freeze Order: Specific Problems Relating to the International 
Monetary Fund, 9 INT'L. Bus. LAW. 97, 98 n.13 (1981).SeealsoAmerica'sBloodApproachesBoil-
ing Point, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1979, at 27. 
205. Berlioz, The Iranian Crisis: The Implication for International Financial Law, 1 
INT'L CoNTRACT-L. FINANCE REv. 10, 11 (1980). 
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[P]ayments which are not for the purpose of transferring capital, 
and ... without limitation: 
(1) All repayments due in connection with foreign trade, 
other current business, including services, and normal short-term 
banking and credit facilities; 
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from 
other investments; 
(3) Payments of moderate amounts for amortization of loans 
of for depreciation of direct investments; 
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses.206 
Lump sum repatriation of capital arguably falls outside IMF 
regulation.201 Nevertheless, insofar as the Iranian assets freeze went 
beyond capital controls, it would seem that without IMF approval, 
its discriminatory nature would render it inconsistent with the Ar-
ticles of the IMF and, therefore, needing to be approved to be a 
restriction internationally enforceable under Article VIIl(2)(b). 
C. THE SETTLEMENT OF MONETARY DISPUTES INVOLVING 
SECURITY CONCERNS 
The concept of "nullification of impairment" in the GATT does 
not appear in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Also, the pro-
cedure of exhausting consultations prior to a Panel investigation 
and s~bsequent decision of the Contracting Parties is not copied. 
Article XVIII of the Articles of Agreement gives the IMF power 
to interpret its own law where a dispute arises. Unlike the GATT, 
the emphasis is on action by the IMF as regulator rather than simp-
ly on facilitation of settlement between disputant states. It is the 
responsibility of the IMF to promote international monetary 
cooperation and collaboration on international monetary problems208 
through a permanent institution. 
In institutionalising the regulatory process, the IMF has the 
power to tolerate or even condone illegal behavior whilst taking 
action to maintain or, in some cases, restore stable relations. This 
206. Article of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, opened for signature 
Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 at art. XIX(i) (came into force on 
Dec. 27, 1945, by acceptance). 
207. IMF Executive Board Decision No. 541 (56/39) (1958), cited in Pardieu, supra note 
204 at 99; J. GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
13 (1956) (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 3). 
208. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 206, art. l(i). 
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centralised interpretative and decision-making power takes the 
member states one step away from having an immediate influence 
on the granting of approval for security based currency restrictions. 
Not only are states more willing to submit to an impartial authori-
ty than a forum of other partial states, but the institution, in main-
taining its impartiality, will be influenced by considerations other 
than particular national sensitivities. 
D. THE IMF IN A COLD WAR 
Although the IMF does not have power to suspend the opera-
tion of all of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement, if an 
emergency arises or unforeseen events threatening the activities 
of the IMF prevent member nations from observing their obliga-
tions, the provisions imposing the obligations can be suspended from 
operation. Substitute rules can be adopted to deal with or adapt 
to the changed circumstances. It is IMF action rather than unilateral 
action which is the protective measure. Such suspension is to be 
distinguished from a waiver. A waiver is selective, applying only 
to certain member nations. It excuses otherwise violative conduct. 
A suspension applies to all member nations and removes the need 
for a member nation to excuse its action.209 
The IMF also tolerates action which is legally invalid. For ex-
ample, during the 1970's, there was an absence of consensus on 
whether the IMF should have authority to condone floating ex-
change rates, the rule then being fixed exchange rates. Violative 
action, particularly by the United States, was seen as an attempt 
to induce legal change. That change came with the Second Amend-
ment to the Articles of Agreement.210 This preference for centralised 
rather than unilateral decision-making is in contrast to the 
mechanism practised under the GATT in Articles XIX, XX and 
XXL Unilateral action is the exception which became a rule in 
GATT practice. Both institutions are intended to survive a cold war 
albeit by different mechanisms. 
In the three major cases brought to its attention under Deci-
sion 144-(52/51), the IMF has approved the restrictions imposed. In 
one case approval was not sought and the restrictions then 
209. J. GOLD, supra note 188 at 35-38. 
210. In place on or before Nov. 30, 1983, cited in J.H. JACKSON 1983 SUPPLEMENTARY 
NOTES AND MATERIALS 31 (1983) (of use with JACKSON 1977, supra note 65). 
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imploded. In 1950, the United States restricted the making of 
payments and transfers to the People's Republic of China. Cuba 
adopted similar restrictions in 1951. After the adoption of Decision 
144-(52/51), these restrictions were approved retroactively. In the 
absence of objection from another member, the IMF did not evaluate 
the claim that security concerns were involved. In the 1960's pur-
suant to UN Security Council Resolutions 221,211 232,212 and 253,213 
restrictions imposed by members with respect to Rhodesia were 
approved by the IMF .214 They were lifted upon the recognition of 
Zimbabwe in 1979.215 When given the opportunity to do so, the IMF 
will defer to UN expertise in security matters. 
These approvals, along with the approval for the Iranian assets 
freeze, need to be contrasted with situations in which approval was 
not sought. One can but speculate whether apprehension of disap-
proval led to any decisions not to seek approval. During the 1956 
dispute over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company by 
Egypt, Egypt, the United Kingdom and the United States 
established restrictions, but did not seek approvals. The United 
Kingdom's action, in particular, foundered216 confidence in the British 
pound causing it to drop in correlation with British handling of the 
Suez affair and the violation of the IMF Articles of Agreement. 
More recently, some nations applying economic sanctions for 
political reasons against South Africa and Israel have not sought 
approval. Although the IMF has not adopted a definition of national 
security for the purposes of Decision 144-(52/51), the hesitancy of 
states to enter the procedure for approval of sanctions suggests 
some doubt as to the legality of their sanctions. To the extent that 
this doubt has acted as a brake upon the sanctions, the centralised 
approval mechanism of the IMF is contributing to international 
peace and security. Unfortunately, no empirical measure of this ef-
fect is available. 
211. Apr. 9, 1966. 
212. Dec. 16, 1966. 
213. May 27, 1968. 
214. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 3 
(1969). 
215. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE AR-
RANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 9. 
216. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS, 117, 
287, 337 (1957). See supra note 204 and accompanying text; cf, Fawcett, The International 
Monetary Fund and International Law, 40 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 32, 65 (1964). 
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Finally, if the IMF were to face the problem of defining "na-
tional security" (following an objection to a notification under Deci-
sion 144-(52/51) for example), the question arises whether the IMF 
would decline to pass upon that question. Sir Joseph Gold would 
appear to favour complete non-appraisal of political considerations. 
The last sentence of Article I setting out the purposes of the IMF 
directs the IMF to "be guided in all policies and decisions by the 
purposes set forth in this Article."211 Sir Joseph argues that con-
siderations inconsistent therewith may not be taken into account 
by the IMF.218 Inductively reasoning from the obligations of the IMF 
to respect the domestic social and political policies of members in 
connection with the regulation of exchange rate policies219 and par 
values,220 the IMF is said to be impliedly required to take notice 
of such policies, but to refrain from passing judgment upon them.221 
However, in devising adjustment program for members with 
balance of payments problems, the IMF is permitted to conclude 
that economic considerations outweigh national political objectives 
if these objectives would prevent a use of IMF resources consis-
tent with the Articles.222 
Of course, that a decision has political consequences does not 
make it politically motivated. This element may be seen as induc-
ing Decision No. 144-(52/51). The IMF, in line with the commitment 
to centralised rather than unilateral interpretations of international 
monetary law, reserves to the Executive Board, with appeal to the 
Board of Governors, jurisdiction to interpret the Articles.223 Restric-
tions approved by the IMF pursuant to Decision 144-(52/51) cannot 
be challenged as inconsistent with the Articles. All of this begs the 
question whether the IMF could decline to adjudge one member's 
217. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 206, art. I. 
218. J. GOLD. supra note 188, at 58; accord Articles of Agreement of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, supra note 195, art. IV(b). 
219. Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund art. IV (3)(b), done Apr. 30, 1926, 29 U.S.T. 2204, T.l.A.S. 8932. 
220. Id. art. IV(4). 
221. J. GOLD. supra note 188, at 60. 
222. Decision on Use of Funds, General Resourses, and Stand-By Arrangements, Deci-
sion No. 6056-(79/38), Mar. 2, 1979, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND 136-38. 
223. Second Amendment to the Articles of the International Monetary Fund, supra 
note 220, art. XXIX. See generally, J. GOLD. INTERPRETATION BY THE FUND (1968) (IMF Pam-
phlet Series No. 11). 
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claim for national security restrictions in the face of an objection 
thereto by another. The toleration of restrictions imposed against 
Israel, for example, suggests that the IMF would decline to pass 
upon the substantive issues. 
F. A CASE STUDY: THE IRANIAN ASSETS FREEZE IN THE IMF 
The handling of the Iranian assets freeze is instructive to show 
the importance of the questions. Where currency exchange restric-
tions are concerned, the IMF does have exclusive jurisdiction over 
the problem. The U.S. regulations were adopted on November 14, 
1979, and amended five days later. It may be that they were infor-
mally notified to the IMF at that time,224 but they were formally 
notified only on November 29, 1979. Iran did try to persuade the 
Executive Board to object.225 These efforts were unsuccessful.226 The 
U.S. regulations were amended on April 7 and 17, 1980. These were 
notified on April 28, 1980, and also received automatic approval.221 
It needs to be remembered that the Managing Director, as Chair-
man of the Executive Board, prepares the agenda for Board 
meetings.228 He must place on it any case which appears to him or 
another Executive Director to involve a member not fulfilling its 
obligations under the Articles.229 
Iran seems to have lacked the support of even one Executive 
Director. The question being one upon which the IMF could request 
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice pur-
suant to Article VIII of the Agreement between the IMF and the 
UN ,230 it appears that, in the view of the Executive Board, the 
legitimacy of the U.S. action was not for judicial consideration. 
When first promulgated, the U.S. actions were described as 
protective measures in the face of Iranian plans to undermine the 
international banking system. As time passed it became clear that 
the action was a reprisal for the hostage taking. Nevertheless, the 
224. Edwards, Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Iranian Assets Control Regula-
tions, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 870, 875 (1981). 
225. Washington Post, Dec. 28, 1979, Al3, col. 1. 
226. Letter from George P. Nicoletopoulos, supra note 198. 
227. Id. 
228. IMF, Rules and Regulations (36th issue, 1979) Rule C-6, in IMF BY·LAWS, Rules 
? nd Regulations at 24. 
229. Id.; see also Rule K-1 at 44 and Rule S-1 at 62. 
230. See Selected Decisions of the International Monetary Fund and Selected Documents, 
supra note 191, at 230-31. 
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IMF approval remained in place. Given the selective nature of UN 
involvement in world crises, calls for rendering IMF approval con-
ditional upon UN approval or ratification231 may not be a political-
ly neutral brake on unwarranted restrictions. The IMF would then 
be subrogating its power to the political winds in the UN. While 
UN approval is a relevant factor, it ought not be a determinative 
one. 
Restrictions not receiving the imprematur of the IMF cannot 
be enforced extraterritorially under Article VIIl(2)(b). By giving 
automatic approval after thirty days, the scope for operation of Ar-
ticle VIIl(2)(b) is a wide one. Although the approval has not been 
sought by nations in doubt as to the legitimacy of their restrictions 
thus far, the policy of automatic approval effectively leaves the issue 
of substantive legitimacy for unilateral decision. This issue is the 
definition of the threshold state of nature sufficient to ground a 
claim for approval. This fits ill with the overall approach to cen-
tralised decision-making in the IMF. 
On the other hand, rendering restrictions unapproved until 
brought before the Executive Board may leave the IMF in the posi-
tion of declaring a politically expedient restrictio'n economically un-
justifiable. The IMF need never make decisions for ostensibly 
political reasons. However, by not passing an economic analysis over 
sanctions, the economic base of international peace and security 
becomes subject to not merely non-regulation but also the com-
pounding nature of enforcement under Article VIIl(2)(b).232 The 
rendering moot of the litigation in London and Paris with respect 
to the application of this Article to the Iranian assets freeze has 
but stayed the crucial judicial test of Decision 144-(52/51).233 
VI. A COMPARISON OF THE GATT AND IMF 
APPROACHES TO SECURITY CONCERNS 
The bottom line of any comparison of the GATT and IMF ap-
proaches to the impact of security concerns upon world trade and 
231. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 224 at 897-98. 
232. Outside of Article VIIl(2)(b), extra-territorial enforcement would almost certainly 
be refused. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Uranium Contract [1978] 2 W.L.R. 84. 
233. There are earlier decisions pertinent to this issue. See Baker, Enforcement of Con-
tracts Violating Foreign Exchange Control Laws, 3 INT'L TRADE L.J. 247 (1977); cf, Craigie, 
Oakes and L'Estrange, The Presidential Order Freezing Iranian Assets-Some Extraterritorial 
Aspects, 8 INT'L TRADE L. SEMINAR PAPERS 329, 341-45 (Austl. 1981). 
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monetary law is a test of the effectiveness of each in deterring those 
breaches of international economic law whose basis is a security 
concern of doubtful objectivity. Within the GATT it is the odium 
of the restricting states' trading partners which is the prime deter-
rent. Trade restrictions imposed under Article XXI operate terri-
torially, excepting of course, the extent to which United States 
claims for extraterritorial jurisdiction gain international support. 
Only in the Ministerial Declaration of November 1982, was there 
an attempt to encourage states to legitimate their invocations of 
Article XXL 
In its dispute with Nicaragua, the U.S. restrictions would have 
been difficult to so legitimate. The United States, therefore, chose 
not to oppose the adoption of the GATT Panel's recommendations 
to hold its actions in violation of the GATT, and instead relied on 
its patent ability to withstand any consequent international 
pressures. This attitude implies a disinclination to submit to the 
system of multilateral regulation which the United States was so 
instrumental in establishing. The United States reaction to the in-
terim decision of the ICJ in the recent dispute with Nicaragua 
evidences a similar policy. 
By contrast, although the IMF has not had to face the defini-
tional problem of determining which security claims do or do not 
validly fall within the ambit of Decision 144-(52/51), it has had 
somewhat more success in deterring questionable claims for 
legitimacy. Because exchange restrictions generally require inter-
national enforcement to be truly effective, and, because pursuant 
to Article VIIl(2)(b) of the IMF Articles of Agreement approval is 
essential to such enforcement where restrictions are imposed for 
security reasons, Decision 144-(52/51) assumes focal importance. The 
decision throws claims for legitimacy into the limelight for thirty 
days. That decision to approve is centralised in the Executive Board. 
Its decision is exclusive and subject only to review by the Board 
of Governors. 
The IMF process of legitimation is less subtle than under the 
GATT. As a result, some nations imposing restrictions have been 
deterred from seeking approval. Their action remains inconsistent 
with the Articles of the IMF unless approved. Action under GA TT 
Article XXI bears no similar odium until successfully challenged. 
It is difficult to see how the IMF procedure could be effectively 
transposed to the GATT context. International enforcement of trade 
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restrictions is not an essential ingredient for those restrictions to 
have a real impact on the object state. Nicaragua's sugar industry 
is the definitive example. On the other hand, if unlegitimated restric-
tions could validly be mitigated by a centralised compensation 
mechanism administered by a politically neutral international in-
stitution associated with the GATT, illegitimate restrictions might 
be rendered ineffective. This would pressure the restricting state 
to submit to multilateral regulation of its actions. In the United 
States-Czechoslovakia dispute the cold war trade barriers estab-
lished by the United States were effectively given a GATT waiver. 
The Czech grievance was given an airing. However, by accepting 
without reservation the principle that a state's unilateral identifica-
tion of security crises could not be reviewed, the floodgates were 
opened for a limited exception to experience its unregulated growth. 
Thus, in the United States-Nicaragua dispute, the United States 
was not willing to discuss an economic sanction because it was im-
posed for security sensitive reasons. Only the allegation of breach 
of GATT obligations was investigated and confirmed without an 
examination of the validity of the U.S. excuse. 
In both of these cases, the dispute may well have been beyond 
resolution. There was no discussion of a legal rule which might at 
least have helped the parties understand and perhaps reduce the 
economic ill effects of their actions. In the absence of a rule pro-
moting consultation, power diplomacy has been given sway and 
neither the wealth maximization function of international econo~ic 
law, nor the peace promotion function of public international law 
was advanced. 
The IMF approach provides a thirty day period in which discus-
sion may be pursued. While no substantive rule for limiting the use 
of national security as a ground for imposing currency restrictions 
has been developed, the system does not admit untrammelled 
unilateral interpretation. This alone appears to discourage some 
doubtful claims for legitimacy. By not according all claims of na-
tional security automatic legitimacy, the subtle processes of inter-
national opprobrium are allowed to operate upon the apparently 
illegitimate actions. Although these subtle mechanisms do not 
always have discernible effects, activating them through rules which 
distinguish the excusable from the illegitimate enhances world order 
better than a power-based system which does not require even a 
limited legitimation of certain international actions. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Having raised the question of whether differently structured 
economies can both gain from trade and retain a sense of national 
security, this paper has sought to analyse the progress of interna-
tional economic law in regulating the interface between trade and 
defence policies. In the international legal system coercion can 
lubricate, but does not fuel the wheels of the legal system. Because 
international law often depends upon an imprecise consensus, states 
will only behave within the law if they see legally obedient 
behaviour to be in their interest. When nations' sense of insecuri-
ty leads not only to the distrust of other nations but of the legal 
framework in which international relations are conducted, this con-
sensus dissipates. A process of entropic autarky sets in. 
This distrust can best be dispelled by giving problems airing 
in international forums without necessarily requiring any formal 
adjudiciation. International law, after all, is enforced by the subtle 
means of peer pressures. Resolution can occur as the states involved 
listen to, and perhaps, better understand their neighbours' interests. 
They may then be more willing to discuss security concerns know-
ing that no formal adjudication against their interests will result. 
Such an international forum needs to both be and appear to 
be an impartial, readily available and effective framework for 
facilitating the resolution of disputes. It at least gives the option 
of peaceful settlement without further aggravation of the at-
mosphere of tension and distrust which can lead to non-peaceful 
reprisals. Moreover, the availability of such a forum, actively sup-
ported by states practice, reduces the perceived normative 
legitimacy of less peaceful alternatives. Notwithstanding the find-
ing by the arbitral tribunal in the United States-France dispute, 
discussed in Section III.C., that there is no duty to postpone 
retaliatory action until less inflammatory yet practicable means for 
dispute resolution had been exhausfed, states prefer to be seen as 
pursuing non-inflammatory as well as legitimate avenues for 
redress. 
Following the collapse of the ITO, the GATT emerged as the 
primary forum for resolution of international trade disputes. The 
rules of and exceptions in the GA TT system may be interpreted 
according to competing legal principles. This reflects the different 
economic structures of the nations party to and applying the GATT. 
An effective consensus has not been achieved. Without effecti'\Te 
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multilateral regulation, nations' behaviour under the GATT is likely 
to remain non-congruent. 
This is precisely what has occured in relation to GATT Arti-
cle XXL The exception, interpreted literally, is extremely broad 
and permits the emasculation of the very objectives of the GATT. 
The states' representatives who perform the task of interpretation 
are not always seen as impartial in their approaches to this task. 
It has been argued that the exception has not been interpreted in 
good faith and is proving to be an Achilles heel of the GA TT. 
The seeds of entropy were sown in the United States-
Czechoslovakia dispute. Some three decades later in its dispute with 
Nicaragua, the United States declined the very jurisdiction of the 
GATT by adopting instead an overtly autarkic behaviour. The for-
mal limitation of the exception in the drafting of the GATT to mat-
ters of a nation's own national security does not appear to influence 
the conduct of the United States. Arguably the non-congruent con-
duct of the United States has prevented the text of Article XXI 
from developing into customary international law. It is even possible 
to see the broad practice of claiming exemption under Article XXI 
as a declaration by the states concerned that they see GATT obliga-
tions as less than legally binding, both in war and cold war climates. 
Article XXI is thus unable to fully perform its role of preserving 
GATT obligations through periods of cold ear. Moreover, once a 
leading nation shows disregard for legal forums, other nations will 
follow. The process of entropic autarky snowballs. 
The IMF may be contrasted with the parlous state of GATT 
practice. In the IMF context, international enforceability of 
monetary sanctions taken for security reasons depends upon IMF 
approval. The sanctions will be ineffective without such approval. 
Former Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal favoured an 
American approach which did not involve the IMF making political 
judgments, but did involve the IMF continuing to make economic 
decisions even where those decisions had political consequences-
including national security consequences. 
Under the Decision 144-(52/51) procedure, the subtle pressures 
of international opprobrium are given an opportunity to operate 
as states seeking to utilise the national security exception are re-
quired to face international scrutiny for at least thirty days. The 
IMF acts as regulator rather than as facilitator of settlement as 
is the case with the GA TT. The decisionmaker is therefore an im-
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partial institutional authority rather than a number of partial states' 
representatives. In the case of the Iranian assets freeze, it was the 
IMF action rather than unilateral action which legitimated the pro-
tection of the United States dollar from the Iranian threat to under-
mine that currency. Of course, that a decision has political conse-
quences does not make it politically motivated. Perhaps the essen-
tial difference is one of perception. Decisions emanating from the 
GATT are not seen as impartial nor as having terribly much legal 
relevance. Decisions emanating from the IMF, however, receive a 
mark of respect from the international community. 
Even if one accepts the argument that the process of entropic 
autarky in international economic law is at an advanced stage and, 
therefore, the establishment and evolution of a widely applicable 
control on claims for the national security exception could not 
remedy the situation quickly enough, it is certainly within the power 
of world leaders to congregate with a view to developing convergent 
policies rather than to continue airing unilateral expressions of 
distrust. A liberal world trade order. along with a liberal world 
monetary order requires not only a lowering of barriers to inter-
national economic transactions, but also active promotion of 
economic development for the weak by the strong with a view to 
mutual advantage. Not only do the less developed economies gain 
by achieving development relevant to their own needs, but the 
stronger economies and the world economy as a whole gain by na-
tions entering into their economic and political relations with a sense 
of security and willingness to cooperate. It is upon achieving such 
a reversal of the present trend towards autarky that international 
economic institutions can be developed to maintain a process of 
secure, peaceful and prosperous economic development. The pro-
cess of developing convergence in place of autarky can feasibly be 
initiated at the present time. Once the foundations are laid, impar-
tial multilateral regulation of the problems discussed in this arti-
cle can be developed. The time has arrived where the interface be-
tween security and trade issues can no longer be profitably put in 
the "too-hard basket." 
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